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Abstract
We show that in an open-economy OLG model, the interaction between growth
differentials and household credit constraints, more severe in fast-growing countries, can
explain three prominent global trends: a divergence in private saving rates between
advanced and emerging economies, large net capital outflows from the latter, and a
sustained decline in the world interest rate. Micro-level evidence on the evolution of
age-saving profiles in the U.S. and China corroborates our mechanism. Quantitatively,
our model explains about 40 percent of the divergence in aggregate saving rates, and a
significant portion of the variations in age-saving profiles across countries and over time.
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1 Introduction
Two of the most important developments in the global economy of the recent decades are the
integration of emerging markets into world capital markets and their rapid growth, particu-
larly in certain parts of Asia. Alongside these events are three striking and unprecedented
macroeconomic trends: (1) a large and persistent increase in the private saving rate in emerg-
ing Asia against a steady decline in the private saving rate in advanced economies; (2) the
emergence of global imbalances, with developing countries running a large current account
surplus and advanced economies a current account deficit; (3) a sustained fall in the world
long-term interest rate.
The striking divergence in the saving rates of advanced economies vs. those of Emerging
Asia is depicted in Figure 1.1. The gap in private saving rates across regions, interestingly,
was rather small at the time of their integration around 1990 (top panel). The diverging
pattern is even more obvious when it comes to household saving rates in countries such as
the U.S. and China (bottom panel). In the late 1980s, China’s household saving rate was a
mere 3.5 percentage points higher than that of the U.S.. By 2008, it had reached almost 30%
while the U.S. saving rate had declined to about 2.5% — leading to the popular caricature of
a ‘debt-ridden’ U.S. put into sharp contrast against a ‘thrifty’ Asia.
Observations on the macroeconomic level, however, can mask heterogenous behavior at
the micro level. The microeconomic approach typically stresses heterogeneity in consumption
and saving behavior over the lifecycle. A natural question to ask is: how did different age
groups contribute to the staggering divergence in household saving rates? Estimating age-
saving profiles for the U.S. and China, we document the following stylized facts: (i) the saving
rate of young individuals fell significantly in the U.S. over 1988-2008—by about 13 percentage
points—but remained approximately constant in China; (ii) the saving rate of the middle-aged
rose in both countries, but by about 15 percentage points more in China than in the U.S.; (iii)
there is a marked divergence of saving rates for the retirees—with China’s elderly seeing a
sharp rise and the U.S.’ seeing a large drop. The elderly, however, contribute less to aggregate
saving than the other age groups.
In this paper, we attempt to bridge the macroeconomic approach with the microeconomic
approach in understanding the set of global facts (1)-(3). First, we provide an overlapping-
generation theory of growth in an open economy where households face different levels of
credit constraints across countries. We show that the interaction between growth differentials
and heterogenous credit constraints — more severe in Emerging economies — can generate
the set of aggregate facts, while yielding distinct predictions on age-specific saving behavior
across countries and over time. Second, using consumption survey data, we provide new
micro-level evidence on age-saving profiles in the U.S. and China and their evolution. These
micro facts are important as they provide an additional empirical barometer against which the
quantitative performance of our theory can be assessed. This leads to our third contribution,
which is to develop a quantitative multi-period OLG model, calibrated to aggregate and micro
data for the U.S. and China.
Explaining the global patterns (1)-(3) constitutes a challenge for standard open-economy
growth models. Standard theories predict that a fast growing economy such as China should
experience a fall in saving rate as agents borrow against their higher future income to augment
consumption and investment, contributing to a rise in the world interest rate. In face of
high domestic investment needs, China would become a net capital importer rather than
a net exporter. This discrepancy between theory and evidence is forcefully pointed out by
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2011), who refer to it as the “allocation puzzle”. For any theory
to successfully capture the global phenomenon, the challenge is to explain why saving can
outpace investment in a growing economy—but also in light of Figure 1.1, to account for the
asymmetric evolution of saving rates across countries with the same underlying mechanism.
The pronounced divergence in household saving rates and the differential saving behav-
ior across age groups motivate our theory. Our baseline theoretical framework, analyzed in
Section 2, consists of large open economies populated with agents living for three periods.
This structure provides scope for both international and intergenerational borrowing.1 Young
1Our baseline framework is an extension of Jappelli and Pagano’s (1994) closed-economy, three-period OLG
model with household credit constraints. Our environment differs from theirs in several dimensions: (1) the
multi-country, open-economy aspect of our setup; (2) the asymmetry in household credit constraints across
countries; (3) more general preferences; (4) more general income profiles.
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agents are all subject to borrowing constraints, but the tightness of the constraint is more
severe in developing countries than in advanced economies. A fall in the world interest rate
induces greater borrowing by the young— through a loosening of constraints, and greater
savings of the middle-aged— through a dominant income effect.2 Asymmetric credit con-
straints imply that the young’s saving rate falls by more in less constrained economies, while
the rise in the middle-aged’s saving rate is larger in more constrained ones. This leads to dif-
ferent responses of aggregate saving rates across countries which, combined with initial level
differences, generate a divergence in saving rates in the long run.
In this framework, the decline in the world interest rate is brought about by the increasing
size of Asia relative to the rest of the world. Faster growth in Emerging Asia results in a greater
weight being put on its (lower) long-run autarkic interest rate in determining the dynamics
of the world interest rate.3 The interaction of growth and heterogenous credit constraints is
key. Without growth differentials, or with symmetric constraints across countries, the world
interest rate would not permanently decline—critical for the saving divergence. Moreover in
the transition, tighter credit constraints in Asia serve to limit the impact of the positive wealth
effect caused by fast productivity growth for young consumers.
In Section 3, we dissect household survey data to provide new micro-evidence on saving
behavior by age groups. We select two exemplary economies that arguably occupy opposite
positions in the spectrum of credit constraint tightness, and are also the two most impor-
tant contributors to global imbalances—the U.S. and China. The empirical challenge is to
accurately measure age-saving profiles in the presence of potentially large biases inherent to
household surveys in both countries—distinct problems yet equally taxing. The U.S. con-
sumption survey data suffer from significant underreporting biases that can, in addition, be
time-varying (Slesnick (1992)). The Chinese household survey suffers from limited data avail-
ability at the individual level. A common practice to circumvent this problem is to use the
2In our baseline model, the income effect dominates if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is smaller
than one, as usually assumed and in line with most of the empirical evidence (see Campbell (2003)).
3What matters for the long-run dynamics of the world interest rate is that Emerging Asia’s autarkic steady-
state interest rate is lower. Note however that if Asia is capital scarce initially, its interest rate can be higher
than that of Advanced economies at the time of opening.
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age of the household head in constructing age-saving profiles. We demonstrate that two biases
ensue in the presence of multi-generational households, which are prevalent in China: a selec-
tion bias which tends to overestimate the saving rate of the young and its change over time,
and an aggregation bias which tends to underestimate those of the middle-aged (the Deaton
and Paxson (2000) critique). We attempt to remove these biases to the best of our efforts and
estimate age-saving behavior for both economies over two decades. The corrected age-saving
profiles generally conform better with standard lifecycle hypotheses and lend broad support
to the qualitative implications of our theory.
Equipped with both macroeconomic and microeconomic facts, we assess in Section 4 the
quantitative relevance of our model. We turn to an extended, quantitative version of the
model, calibrated to the experiences of the U.S. and China over the period 1968-2008, incor-
porating in particular the evolution of demographics and income profiles in both countries.
We find that the model can explain more than 40 percent of the divergence in aggregate saving
rates between the U.S. and China, and a significant portion of the evolution in the shape of
the age-saving profile in both economies. The model however falls short of explaining the
very large increase in household savings in China, especially for the elderly, pointing to the
need for complementary mechanisms, potentially country-specific. Regarding current account
imbalances, the model captures well the dynamics observed in the data, with China experienc-
ing a small current account deficit at the time of opening, before building up a large current
account surplus. Finally, the model predicts a significant drop in the world interest rate.
While the cross-country asymmetry in credit constraints is essential and the key driver
of our results, our analysis indicates that the sharp aging of the population in China and
differences in income profiles across countries, in their interaction with credit constraints, also
contribute to the divergence in saving rates. We find in the data that the age-income profile
in China reaches its peak at an earlier age than in the U.S. and falls more steeply in old age,
especially in the more recent period. This particular feature reduces the strength of positive
wealth effects on middle age consumption implied by faster growth and a falling interest rate—
thus contributing to the large increase in the saving rate in China generated by the model
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(see also Guo and Perri (2012)).4 The role of demographics matters insofar as the rapid aging
of the Chinese population, mostly a result of the one-child policy, implies an increase in the
the share of the middle-aged savers— a composition effect which also amplifies the increase
in household savings in China.
To the best of our knowledge, combining the macro and micro-level approaches is a dis-
tinctive feature of this paper. Past papers on international capital flows between developed
and developing economies have usually taken up the former. Among these, theories relying
on market imperfections are most closely related to our work (see Gourinchas and Rey (2013)
for a recent survey). Frictions that impact savings include asset scarcity in developing coun-
tries (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2009)), incomplete financial markets and uninsurable
risk in these economies (Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009)),5 lack of firm’s access to
liquidity to finance investment in periods of rapid growth (Benhima and Bacchetta (2011)),
and international borrowing constraints (Benigno and Fornaro (2012)). Financial frictions on
investment are analyzed in Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011), Buera and Shin (2011),
and Benhima (2012). Aguiar and Amador (2011) provide a political economy perspective with
contracting frictions, where fast growing countries tend to experience net capital outflows.
There are three distinguishing elements that mark our theory from the aforementioned.
The first is the emphasis on growth in emerging economies as a key driver of these aggregate
phenomena—as opposed to capital market integration or shocks to financial markets in devel-
oping countries that are typically analyzed.6 The second aspect is the ability of our model to
explain the saving rate divergence across countries (a time-series effect)—as opposed to mere
differences in levels. Third, we emphasize household saving divergence as the main driver of
global imbalances, in contrast with investment-based or corporate-saving-based explanations.7
4Gourinchas and Rey (2013) also point out the role of the shape of income profiles in generating differences
in savings and autarky interest rates across countries. Note that wealth effects on middle-aged consumers do
not operate in the three-period model of Section 2 since agents receive zero labor income in old age.
5See also Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Sandri (2010), and Angeletos and Panouzi (2011).
6Exceptions are Caballero et al. (2009), Buera and Shin (2011), and Benhima and Bacchetta (2011) who
also analyze the impact of faster growth in developing countries.
7Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011), Buera and Shin (2011), and Benhima (2012) show that financial
frictions can suppress firm investment demand, leading to net capital outflows from developing countries. From
an empirical standpoint however, the period of pronounced global imbalances saw an increase in investment
to GDP in Asia rather than a fall (Figure 1.4). Sandri (2010) and Benhima and Bacchetta (2011) focus on
5
There is compelling evidence supporting the view that the saving divergence was the main
driver of global imbalances. The U.S. experience over the period 1970-2008, depicted in the
top panel of Figure 1.2, shows a strong relationship between household saving and the current
account, while there is hardly any relationship between investment and the current account.
China echoes this experience (bottom panel). In the cross section, turning to a large group
of countries over the period 1998-2007, it is also evident from Figure 1.3 that the dispersion
in saving rates accounts for most of the dispersion in the current account. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2011) provide further support to this view, showing that saving wedges, rather than
investment wedges, are necessary for the standard neoclassical model to replicate the patterns
of international capital flows. This paper offers a theory of saving wedges, focusing specifically
on household savings.8
Our quantitative findings are also related to previous papers highlighting the role of de-
mographics, combined with lifecycle saving behavior, in explaining international capital flows.
These include empirical studies such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), and quantitative
analyses focusing on OECD countries such as Domeij and Flode´n (2006) and Ferrero (2010).
The decline in the household saving rate in the U.S. and its rise in China have, indepen-
dently, garnered a lot of attention. The particular stance we take in this paper is that global
forces shaped these patterns simultaneously. That is not to say that there are no separate,
country-specific, reasons why the U.S. saving rate may have declined and China’s saving rate
may have risen. As our theory relies on one single global mechanism, unsurprisingly, it falls
short of explaining the full divergence of saving rates across countries. We thus view the
alternative explanations relevant to each of these economies as complementary to ours in ac-
counting for the full dynamics of savings. Our work is therefore partly related to a series of
papers attempting to explain the large decline in the U.S. household saving rate, summarized
in Parker (2000) and Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2009),9 as well as to a large literature tackling
corporate savings.
8Empirically, Karabarbounis and Nieman (2012) find that corporate savings have risen uniformly in de-
veloping and advanced economies. Bayoumi, Tong, and Wei (2011), using firm-level data, show that Chinese
firms’ saving rate is not significantly higher than the global average.
9The decline in the U.S. saving rate has been attributed to positive wealth effects (Poterba (2000), Juster et
al. (2006), Caroll et al. (2011)); financial innovation and relaxation of borrowing constraints (Parker (2000),
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the “Chinese saving puzzle” (Modigliani and Cao (2004)), recently surveyed in Yang, Zhang
and Zhou (2011), and Yang (2012).10 In a nutshell, our work provides a micro-founded expla-
nation for the emergence of a ‘global saving glut’ (Bernanke (2005)) that induced a decline in
the world interest rate and the subsequent saving divergence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework and provides
some key intuitions and analytical results, along with a numerical experiment illustrating the
impact of fast growth and integration of emerging markets on the global economy. Section 3
investigates micro-level evidence on saving behavior by age groups in China and the U.S..
Section 4 examines the quantitative performance of a fully-calibrated model for these two
economies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
The world economy consists of large open economies, populated with overlapping generations
of consumers who live for three periods. We let γ ∈ {y,m, o} denote a generation. Consumers
supply one unit of labor when young (γ = y) and when in middle age (γ = m), and retire when
old (γ = o). In youth, consumers are credit-constrained, but the severity of that constraint
differs across countries. In all other aspects our framework is standard. All countries use
the same technology to produce one homogeneous good, which is used for consumption and
investment, and is traded freely and costlessly. Preferences and production technologies have
the same structure and parameter values across countries. Technologies only differ to the
extent that labor input in each country consists of only domestic labor, and firms are subject
to changes in country-specific productivity levels and labor force.
Boz and Mendoza (2012), and Ferrero (2012)); changes in social security and redistribution schemes (Gokhale,
Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus (1996), Huggett and Ventura (2000)).
10Some compelling explanations emphasize the role of precautionary savings (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005),
Chamon, Liu and Prasad (2010), and Chamon and Prasad (2010)); structural demographic changes (Curtis,
Lugauer and Mark (2011), Ge, Yang and Zhang (2012), and Choukhmane, Coeurdacier and Jin (2013));
changes in life-income profiles and pension reforms (Song and Yang (2010), Guo and Perri (2012)); gender
imbalances and competition in the marriage market (Wei and Zhang (2009)).
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2.1 Production
Let Kit denote the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t in country i, and
eitL
i
y,t+L
i
m,t the total labor input employed in period t, where L
i
γ,t denotes the size of generation
γ and eit the relative productivity of young workers (e
i
t < 1). The gross output in country i is
Y it =
(
Kit
)α [
Ait
(
eitL
i
y,t + L
i
m,t
)]1−α
, (1)
where 0 < α < 1, and Ait is country-specific productivity. The capital stock in country i
depreciates at rate δ and is augmented by investment goods, I it , with law of motion
Kit+1 = (1− δ)K
i
t + I
i
t . (2)
Factor markets are competitive so that each factor, capital and labor, earns its marginal
product. Thus, the wage rates per unit of labor in youth and middle age for country i are
wiy,t = e
i
t(1− α)A
i
t
(
kit
)α
, wim,t = (1− α)A
i
t
(
kit
)α
, (3)
where kit ≡ K
i
t/[A
i
t(e
i
tL
i
y,t + L
i
m,t)] denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The rental rate
earned by capital in production equals the marginal product of capital, riK,t = α (k
i
t)
α−1
. The
gross rate of return earned between period t−1 and t in country i is therefore Rit = 1−δ+r
i
K,t.
We let giA,t and g
i
L,t denote the growth rate of productivity and of the size of consecutive
cohorts, respectively, so that Ait = (1 + g
i
A,t)A
i
t−1 and L
i
y,t = (1 + g
i
L,t)L
i
y,t−1.
2.2 Households
A consumer born in period t earns the competitive wage rate wiy,t when young and w
i
m,t+1 in
the following period. Let ciγ,t denote the consumption of an agent in country i belonging to
generation γ. The lifetime utility of a consumer born in period t in country i is
U it = u(c
i
y,t) + βu(c
i
m,t+1) + β
2u(cio,t+2), (4)
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with standard isoelastic preferences u(c) = (c1−
1
σ − 1)/(1− 1
σ
). The discount factor β satisfies
0 < β < 1 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution coefficient satisfies σ ≤ 1.11
Let aiγ,t+1 denote the net asset holdings at the end of period t of an agent belonging to
generation γ. An agent born in period t faces the following sequence of budget constraints:
ciy,t + a
i
y,t+1 = w
i
y,t, (5)
cim,t+1 + a
i
m,t+2 = w
i
m,t+1 +R
i
t+1a
i
y,t+1, (6)
cio,t+2 = R
i
t+2a
i
m,t+2. (7)
When young, individuals can borrow in order to consume (aiy,t+1 < 0). When middle-aged,
they earn the competitive wage, repay their loans, consume and save for retirement. When
old, they consume all resources available. A bequest motive is omitted for convenience but is
introduced later in the quantitative analysis (Section 4).
We assume that young agents are subject to credit constraints: they can only borrow up
to a fraction θi of the present value of their future labor income,
aiy,t+1 ≥ −θ
i
wim,t+1
Rit+1
. (8)
The tightness of credit conditions, captured by θi, can differ across countries. We are interested
in the case in which (8) is binding for all countries.
Assumption 1 Credit constraints for the young are binding at all times in all countries.
This assumption is satisfied if two conditions hold: (1) θi is small enough— smaller than
the fraction of intertemporal wealth that the young would consume in the absence of credit
constraints; (2) the wage profile is steep enough—and steeper the higher the θi.12 When credit
11Our analytical expressions are still valid when σ > 1, but some of our mechanisms rely on a sufficiently
low e.i.s. coefficient. Most of the empirical literature since the seminal paper of Hall (1988) finds estimates
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution below 0.5 (see Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002), and Yogo (2004) among others). The macro and asset pricing literature (discussed in Guvenen (2006))
typically assumes higher values between 0.5 and 1.
12The conditions are θi < η∗t and
wim,t+1
Ri
t+1
wiy,t
>
1−η∗t
η∗t−θ
i , for all t, where η
∗
t ≡
β−2σ(Rit+1R
i
t+2)
1−σ
1+β−σ(Ri
t+2
)1−σ[1+β−σ(Ri
t+1
)1−σ]
. In
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constraints are binding, the net asset position of the young is
aiy,t+1 = −θ
i
wim,t+1
Rit+1
. (9)
The net asset position of a middle-aged agent at the end of period t is obtained from the Euler
condition that links cim,t and c
i
o,t+1, yielding
aim,t+1 =
1
1 + β−σ(Rit+1)
1−σ
(1− θi)wim,t. (10)
Changes in Rit+1 affects middle-aged asset holdings through a substitution and income effect,
the latter dominating when σ < 1.
2.3 Autarky Equilibrium
Under financial autarky, market clearing requires that the total capital stock accumulated at
the end of period t is equal to aggregate country wealth:
Kit+1 = L
i
y,ta
i
y,t+1 + L
i
m,ta
i
m,t+1. (11)
Along with (9) and (10), this gives the law of motion for ki, the capital-effective-labor ratio
in country i. In the full depreciation case (δ = 1), the dynamic of ki is given implicitly by13
(1 + giA,t+1)(1 + g
i
L,t)
[
1 + eit+1(1 + g
i
L,t+1) + θ
i1− α
α
]
kit+1 =
(1− θi)(1− α)
1 + β−σ
{
α(kit+1)
α−1
}1−σ (kit)α.
Figure 2.1 depicts the autarkic law of motion for capital for two different values of the credit
constraint parameter, θL and θH > θL. We can now characterize the impact of θ
i on the steady
state of the economy. To zero in on the effect of differences in credit constraints, we assume
the case of log utility, these conditions amount to θi < (1 + β + β2)−1, and
wim,t+1
Ri
t+1
wiy,t
>
β(1+β)
1−θi(1+β+β2) . Note
that Assumption 1 is made for analytical convenience but our mechanism goes through as long as the credit
constraint is binding in the more constrained economies.
13Most of our theoretical results are derived for δ = 1, but they hold more generally. The numerical
illustration in Section 2.6 assumes δ < 1.
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kt
k
t+
1
k(θH) k(θ¯) k(θL)
Autarky (θH)
Autarky (θL)
Integration (θ¯)
Figure 2.1: Law of Motion and Steady State: Autarky and Integration.
Parameter values are σ = 0.5, β = 0.97 (annual), α = 0.28, δ = 10% (annual), θH = 0.2, θL = 0.02, gA = 1.5%
(annual), gL = 1%, e = 0.33. A period lasts 20 years.
constant and identical productivity and labor force growth rates gA and gL across countries,
and a fixed relative productivity of young workers e.
Theorem 1 Suppose that δ = 1. There exists a unique, stable, autarky steady state. All else
equal, more constrained economies have a higher capital-to-efficient-labor ratio (dki/dθi < 0)
and a lower interest rate (dRi/dθi > 0).
The proof of Theorem 1 and all other proofs are relegated to Appendix A. More constrained
economies accumulate more capital as a result of less dissaving of the young and lower debt
repayment of the middle-aged, and hence feature a lower rate of return in the long run. In
the case σ = 1, the autarky steady-state interest rate in country i is
Ri = (1 + gA)(1 + gL)
1 + β
β
α[1 + e(1 + gL)] + θ
i(1− α)
(1− α) (1− θi)
. (12)
This expression shows that the rate of return is also increasing in productivity and labor
growth rates, gA and gL, and in the relative efficiency of young workers e—all of which raise
the marginal productivity of capital.14 Demographics matter not only through its impact on
14We analyze the impact of productivity growth differentials on the transition in our numerical experiment.
Effects related to cross-country differences in demographics and income profiles are discussed in Section 4.
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labor force growth, but also on the population composition: a higher proportion of young
agents relative to middle-aged agents due to high gL increases the proportion of borrowers
relative to savers and hence puts upward pressure on the rate of return to capital.
2.4 Integrated Equilibrium
Under financial integration, capital flows across borders until rates of return are equalized
across countries. Financial integration in period t implies that Rit+1 = Rt+1 and k
i
t+1 = kt+1,
for all i. The capital market equilibrium condition becomes
∑
i
Kit+1 =
∑
i
(
Liy,ta
i
y,t+1 + L
i
m,ta
i
m,t+1
)
, (13)
which, along with (9) and (10), gives the law of motion for kt. Next, we characterize the
integrated steady state where the growth rates of productivity and labor, as well as the
relative efficiency of young workers, are identical across countries.
Proposition 1 Suppose that δ = 1. Let θL ≡ mini{θ
i}, θH ≡ maxi{θ
i}, with θL 6= θH . The
steady state world interest rate R satisfies
R(θL) < R < R(θH), (14)
where R(θ) denotes the autarky steady state interest rate for credit constraint parameter θ.
Proposition 1 points to the first factor that can cause a fall in the rate of return faced by
less constrained economies: financial integration with more constrained ones. Figure 2.1
illustrates this effect in a two-country case, assuming that the less constrained country starts
at its autarkic steady state k(θH) whereas the more constrained one is initially capital scarce—
so that the two economies have identical capital-effective-labor ratios at the time of opening.15
Upon integration, the transition path of capital is determined by the integrated law of motion,
15This assumption is made for the ease of graphical representation. One way to think about it is that the
more constrained economy experiences an episode of fast productivity growth before integration, which drives
its capital-effective-labor ratio down at the time of opening.
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which lies in between the autarkic ones. Effectively, the world economy behaves like a closed-
economy with credit constraint parameter θ¯ ≡
∑
i
λiθi, where λi denotes the relative size of
country i measured by its share in world effective labor
λi ≡
Ai,t(eL
i
y,t + L
i
m,t)∑
j Aj,t(eL
j
y,t + L
j
m,t)
. (15)
Along the convergence to the integrated steady state k(θ¯) depicted in Figure 2.1, the world
interest rate experiences a sustained decline.
The second factor that can lead to such decline is faster growth in more constrained
economies. Indeed in the long run, the world interest rate is determined (up to a monotonously
increasing transformation) as a weighted average of the autarky steady-state interest rates of
all countries, with weight on country i increasing in λi.
16 Hence as the more constrained
economies grow faster and account for a greater share of the world economy over time, the
world interest interest rate falls.
Proposition 2 A relative expansion of the more constrained economies (i.e., an increase in
the share λi of a country with low θi) causes a fall in the world interest rate. A relative
expansion of less constrained economies has the opposite effect.
2.5 Saving and Investment
We now show that asymmetric credit constraints lead to heterogeneous responses of saving
rates to a fall in the world interest rate across countries, both at the aggregate level and for
each generation.17 In the integrated steady state, the aggregate net saving to GDP ratio of
country i is
Si
Y i
= −
g
1 + e(1 + gL)
(1− α)
θi
R
+
g
1 + g
1
1 + e(1 + gL)
(1− α)
1− θi
1 + β−σR1−σ
, (16)
16This statement follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1. In the special case where σ = 1, an
alternative representation of the long-run world interest rate is given by Equation (12), substituting the world
average credit constraint parameter θ¯ in place of θi.
17Formal definitions of savings, at the aggregate level and for each generation, are given in Appendix B.
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where R is at its steady-state value, and g ≡ (1 + gA)(1 + gL)− 1 > 0. Equation (16) shows
that more constrained economies (lower θi) place a greater weight on the middle-aged savers
and less weight on young borrowers, resulting in a higher saving rate. Moreover, it implies
that in response to a fall in the world interest rate R, the saving rate increases by more in
the more constrained economy, ∂
2(S/Y )
∂θ∂R
> 0. Combined with differences in levels, these slope
differences imply that a fall in R induces a divergence in saving rates across countries.
Proposition 3 In an integrated global economy with heterogenous credit constraints, a fall in
the world rate of return induces a greater dispersion in saving rates across countries.
Away from the steady state, one can analyze the response of savings to a change in interest
rate by first examining separately the response of each generation’s saving rate (expressed
below as a share of GDP so that they add up to the aggregate net saving rate). We show in
Appendix B that for δ = 1,18
Siy,t
Y it
= −(1 + giA,t+1)
1 + giL,t
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
(1− α)α
α
1−α
θi
kαt
(
1
Rt+1
) 1
1−α
,
Sim,t
Y it
=
1
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
[
1− θi
1 + β−σR1−σt+1
+
θi
Rt
]
(1− α),
Sio,t
Y it
= −
1
1 + giA,t
1
1 + giL,t−1
1
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
1
1 + β−σR1−σt
(1− θi)(1− α)
(
kt−1
kt
)α
.
These equations demonstrate that the partial effect of a fall in the interest rate Rt+1 is more
borrowing by the young—the combined effect of a lower discount rate and higher future wage—
and also more saving by the middle-aged if σ < 1. The strength of these effects, however,
varies across countries. Specifically, the increase in borrowing by the young is larger in the
less constrained economy (high θi), while the increase in saving of the middle-aged is larger in
the more constrained economy (low θi). The net response of the aggregate saving rate again
depends on θi: higher θi gives more importance to the young borrowers’ larger dissavings,
whereas lower θi gives more importance to the middle-aged’s rising saving.
18Normalizing by each generation’s factor income yields similar expressions, up to some multiplicative terms
common across countries.
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We also note that the presence of credit constraints moderates the negative impact of
future growth giA,t+1 on the saving rate: the dissavings of the young can only increase up
to the extent permitted by the binding credit constraints. Thus the standard wealth effect
of growth on saving is mitigated when growth is experienced by a country with tight credit
constraints. Moreover, in the absence of a wage income for the elderly, the wealth effect of
growth does not operate on middle-aged consumers. More generally, the strength of this effect
is reduced when the income profile falls in old age.
Investment is governed by the same forces that underlie the neoclassical growth model.
Under financial integration, differences in investment-output ratios across countries are largely
determined by their relative growth prospects. With full depreciation (δ = 1), investment to
GDP ratios obey
I it/Y
i
t
Ijt /Y
j
t
=
1 + g˜it+1
1 + g˜jt+1
, (17)
where 1 + g˜it+1 ≡ (1 + g
i
A,t+1)
1+eit+1(1+g
i
L,t+1)
eit+(1+g
i
L,t
)−1
denotes the combined growth rate in productivity
and effective labor input in country i.
2.6 Numerical Illustration
We now conduct a numerical experiment to illustrate how financial integration of emerging
markets and their faster growth impinge on the world economy in our framework. Each
period lasts 20 years. We consider two economies, H and L, with credit constraint parameters
θH > θL. These represent Advanced economies and Emerging Asia, respectively. Both regions
are in autarky in period t = −1, and financial opening occurs in period t = 0 (corresponding
to 1970 and 1990, respectively). The Advanced economy starts at its own steady state in
period t = −1, while Emerging Asia is capital-scarce.19 Labor grows at the same constant
growth rate of 1% (annually) in both regions. Productivity in Advanced economies grows
at the steady-state growth rate of 1.5% throughout, while productivity in Emerging Asia
19Another experiment focusing on the impact of growth differentials, where economies are open throughout
and start from their initial integrated steady state, is omitted for the sake of brevity but available upon request.
The main findings are qualitatively similar.
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grows faster at 3% per year between t = −1 and t = 1 (i.e., the 1970-2010 period). The
productivity growth path of Asia, along with the initial relative values of effective labor and
capital-effective-labor ratios, kL−1/k
H
−1, are chosen to match Asia’s relative output share in
1970 and 2010, as well as the relative capital-effective-labor ratios of the two regions in 1990,
as measured by Hall and Jones (1999). All growth rates are perfectly anticipated.
Preference and technology parameters are standard. The intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is taken to be σ = 0.5, and the discount factor β = 0.97 on an annual basis. The
depreciation rate is set at 10 percent per year. The capital share α is set at 0.28 and the
relative productivity of young workers is fixed at e = 0.33.20 For illustrative purposes, we
set θH = 0.20 and θL = 0.02. At this stage, we focus on the qualitative implications of the
experiment. A quantitative evaluation of a richer version of the model is taken up in Section
4, where all parameters are calibrated to aggregate and micro data.
Figure 2.2 displays the results. Since Asia is capital-scarce initially, it features a higher
rate of return than Advanced economies in period t = −1. Rates of return across the two
regions are equalized when capital markets integration occurs in period t = 0. The rapid
decline of Asia’s (shadow) autarky interest rate, combined with its increasing weight in the
economy, leads the world interest rate to decline from the very outset.21 The saving rates
across regions diverge between t = 0 and t = 1 (i.e., 1990-2010), consistent with the data. On
the micro level, the rise in saving rate in Asia is mostly driven by the middle-aged while the
fall in the Advanced economy is driven by the young.22 Finally, due to a spike in investment
at the time of integration, Asia temporarily runs a small current account deficit at opening,
before running a current account surplus of more than 3 percent of GDP in the subsequent
20The parameter α is matched to the share of labor income in the U.S.. The relative productivity of young
workers is chosen to match U.S. age-income profile data. See Section 4 for more details.
21Three factors determine the dynamics of interest rates. The first two factors pin down the paths of interest
rates that would prevail if both regions remained in autarky throughout. The ‘growth effect’ tends to raise
the interest rate in Asia due to higher marginal productivity of capital, while the ‘convergence effect’ tends to
lower the interest rate in Asia as it rapidly accumulates capital from a capital-scarce starting point. After the
opening of capital markets, the ‘integration effect’ determines the world interest rate according to the relative
size of each economy. Here the convergence and integration effects dominate the Asian growth effect.
22The reason the young see a slight rise in saving rate in Emerging Asia, despite the fall in the world
interest rate, is that growth halts after period 1, causing them to borrow less than in earlier periods where
they anticipate rapid income growth. The convergence in aggregate saving rates in later periods is mostly
driven by the behavior of the elderly.
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Figure 2.2: Fast Growth in Asia and Integration: Qualitative Implications.
period. The dynamics of the current account in Asia resembles the one observed in the data,
with small deficits in the early 1990’s and large surpluses in the 2000’s.
Comparisons with Alternative Models. In the absence of credit constraints, the aggre-
gate saving rate would fall in the fast-growing economy as the young borrow more against
their higher future income. Investment would rise and the country would run a large current
account deficit. The fall in the world interest rate would be reduced due to a stronger growth
effect,23 and the interest rate would not experience a prolonged decline in the long run. A
simulation of the model where Emerging Asia has the same degree of credit constraints as
Advanced economies generates saving and investment dynamics that are qualitatively similar
23The interest rate could even rise temporarily if the growth effect dominates the convergence effect.
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to those in a model without constraints. The saving rate of the fast growing economy falls at
time of integration (the opposite for the other country) and then saving rates tend to converge
across economies as agents respond similarly to changes in the interest rate in all countries.
Thus, both the presence of credit constraints and their heterogeneity are vital for our results.
Finally, the shape of the age-income profile, typical of an OLG model, is also important for
the savings divergence. Credit constraints are binding for the young because they start with
a lower labor income. Moreover, the positive wealth effect of growth and falling interest rates
on middle-aged consumers is strongly mitigated when their income in old age is low. A flatter
age-income profile would bring the model closer to a standard representative agent model
without constraints.
3 Micro Evidence on Savings by Age Groups
Motivated by the predictions of our theory at the micro level, we now provide direct evidence
on savings by age groups in Advanced economies and emerging Asia and their evolution
over the last two decades. Because of limited data availability, we focus on two exemplary
countries — the U.S. and China. These two economies are the most important contributors
to global imbalances, and arguably occupy opposite positions in the spectrum of household
credit constraint tightness. A number of complex issues arise when using household survey
data to construct age-saving profiles. This section describes our careful treatment of these
issues and the way we attempt to deal with potential biases. We use our micro findings later
to calibrate our quantitative model and evaluate its performance. Readers only interested in
the quantitative implications can proceed directly to Section 4.
3.1 Evidence for the U.S.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) provides the most comprehensive data on disag-
gregated consumption, and is therefore our primary data source for the U.S.. Annual data
from 1986 to 2008 are available for six age groups: under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and
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above 65. Details of the data are provided in Appendix C.2.
Underreporting Biases. The main issue involved in using CEX data is their sharp dis-
crepancy with the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data. This discrepancy
is well-documented in Slesnick (1992), Laitner and Silverman (2005), Heathcote, Perri and
Violante (2010), and Aguiar and Hurst (2013), and arises from underreporting of both con-
sumption and income in the CEX data. The degree of underreporting has become more severe
over time for consumption but not for income, the consequence of which is a stark rise in the
aggregate saving rate as computed from CEX data, compared to an actual decline as measured
in NIPA data (Figure 3.1). Some important corrections of the CEX are therefore needed to
estimate reasonable age-saving profiles for the U.S..
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Figure 3.1: U.S. Aggregate Saving Rate: NIPA vs. Unadjusted CEX.
Notes: CEX and BEA for the NIPA rate.
Correction Method. Inspired by previous works (Parker et al. (2009) among others),
we assume that NIPA data are well measured, and propose a correction method to bring
consistency between CEX and NIPA data. Our correction method adjusts income uniformly
across all age groups so as to match NIPA data. On the consumption side, we take into
account the fact that the degree of underreporting may vary across goods, which becomes a
concern if the composition of the consumption basket differs across age groups (see Aguiar and
Hurst (2013) for recent evidence). While allowing the degree of underreporting in CEX to vary
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over time and across consumption goods, our correction method relies on the identification
assumption that it is constant across age groups.
In practice, to correct for underreporting in consumption, we use CEX and NIPA data on
aggregate consumption for 15 sectors to construct time-varying, sector-specific adjustment fac-
tors χkt = C
NIPA
kt /C
CEX
kt , where C
D
kt denotes aggregate consumption of good k in dataset D.
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For all sectors, χkt is greater than 1, and rises over time as the underreporting bias in CEX
consumption becomes more severe. We use the sector-specific factors to adjust CEX sectoral
consumption data by age: given cCEXjkt the average consumption of goods of sector k by indi-
viduals of age j as reported in CEX, we define cˆjkt = χktc
CEX
jkt . The adjusted consumption
expenditure for age j is then obtained as cˆj,t =
∑
k cˆjkt.
25 Similarly, our adjusted measure
of income for age j is yˆj,t =
Y NIPAt
Y CEXt
yCEXj,t , where y
CEX
j,t denotes the average income reported
in CEX for age j in year t, and Y Dt the aggregate income in dataset D. By construction,
our corrected consumption and income measures match NIPA in the aggregate.26 Finally, our
estimated saving rate for age j in period t is sˆj,t = (yˆj,t − cˆj,t)/yˆj,t.
Corrected U.S. Age-Saving Profiles. Figure 3.2 displays the estimated saving rates by
age groups for the years 1988 and 2008 using our correction method. Age-saving profiles are
in line with the lifecycle theory, and their shapes show some interesting evolution. In two
decades, the group of young people (under 25) saw a decline of 12.7 percentage points in their
saving rate, while those between 35-54 a small increase of about 2.3 percentage points, and
the eldest group a large decline of about 19 percentage points.
24The 15 sectors matched between NIPA and CEX are: Food and alcoholic beverages, Shelter, Utilities
and public services, Household expenses, Clothing and apparel, Vehicles purchases, Gas and motor oil, Other
vehicle expenses, Public transportation, Health, Entertainment, Education, Tobacco, Miscellaneous and cash
contributions, Life/personal insurance.
25Another issue is that health expenditures are treated differently in NIPA and CEX. Health expenditures
in CEX are restricted to ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses, but NIPA also includes health contributions (Medicare and
Medicaid), leading to very large adjustment factor χhealth. This mostly affects our consumption estimates for
the old, for whom ‘out-of-pocket’ health expenditures constitute a large share of their consumption basket
in CEX. We address this concern by adjusting sectoral adjustment factors for mis-measurement in health
expenditures while still matching NIPA consumption data in the aggregate. See details in Appendix D.1.
26A small discrepancy remains for consumption since NIPA includes expenditure types (e.g., ‘Net foreign
travel and expenditures abroad by U.S. residents’ and ‘Final consumption expenditures of nonprofit institutions
serving households’) which cannot be matched with CEX categories.
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Figure 3.2: Age-Saving Profile for the U.S. in 1988 (left panel) and 2008 (right panel).
Notes: CEX data, 1988-2008; estimates of saving rates are obtained using CEX adjusted data (sectoral-
specific adjustment factors, correcting for health expenditures). Details of the correction techniques are given
in Appendix D.1.
3.2 Evidence for China
The main data source for China is the Urban Household Survey (UHS) conducted by the Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics, available for the year 1986 and annually over the period 1992-2009.
We use the sample of urban households which covers 112 prefectures across 9 representative
provinces, with an overall coverage of about 5,500 households in the 1992 to 2001 surveys and
16,000 households in the 2002 to 2009 surveys.27 The UHS data records detailed information
on income, consumption expenditures, and demographic characteristics of households. It also
provides employment, wages and other characteristics of individuals in the household. Further
information about the data can be found in Appendix C.3.
The main issue that arises with UHS data is that, whereas the survey provides detailed
individual information on income, consumption is only available at the household level. For
this reason, previous studies analyzing age-specific saving behavior in China use household-
level data. That is, the saving rate they impute to a certain age is the average household
saving rate computed over all households whose head is of this age. Following this approach,
Song et al. (2010), Chamon and Prasad (2010), and Chamon, Liu and Prasad (2010) find
evidence against standard lifecycle motives of saving in China. In particular, they find that
27The 1986 survey covers a different sample of 12,185 households across 31 provinces.
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the traditional hump-shaped age-saving profile is replaced by a U-shaped profile in recent
years, with saving rates being highest for the young and close to retirement age, and lowest
for the middle-aged. This would run counter to our prediction that the middle-aged savers in
China should have contributed the most to the rise in household saving rate in the last two
decades. In the next section however, we argue that the ‘household approach’ is subject to
measurement error, for which we then attempt to correct.
Aggregation and Selection Biases. Deaton and Paxson (2000) have forcefully shown the
problems associated with using the household approach to construct age-saving profiles in the
presence of multi-generational households. If a large fraction of households comprise members
that are at very different lifecycle stages, the age-saving profile obtained from household data
will be obscured by an aggregation bias. For instance, suppose that middle-aged individuals
have a high saving rate as they save for retirement, but middle-aged household heads live
with younger adults or elderly members who have much lower saving rates. In this case, the
household approach would lead to an under-estimation of the saving rate of the middle-aged.
More generally, the aggregation bias tends to flatten the true age-saving profile. A second
potential bias arises from the possibility that household headship is not random. If being a
head at a certain age is correlated with certain characteristics (such as income) that affect
saving behavior, the age-saving profile estimated by the household approach would suffer from
a selection bias. Moreover, any time-variation in these two biases would affect the estimated
change in age-specific saving behavior over time.
Table 1: Frequency of Multi-Generational Households in China.
UHS 1992 UHS 2009
2 generations 41% 37%
3 generations 15% 18%
A multi-generational household is the norm in the case of China, thus making the ag-
gregation bias a serious concern (Table 1). In urban households, more than 50 percent of
households are multi-generational (defined as households in which the maximum age differ-
ence between two adults is above 18 years), and roughly one out of six includes three different
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generations.28 Multi-generational households are observed when young adults (typically in
their twenties) stay in their parents’ household or when older individuals (typically in their
seventies) live with their children. A closer look at the data shows that, towards the end of
the sample period, young adults tend to stay longer with their parents, while the elderly tend
to join their children’s household at a later age as a result of an increase in life expectancy
(see Appendix D.2 for further details). These evolutions are likely to introduce some bias in
the estimates of changes in age-specific saving rates obtained from the household approach.
Figure 3.3 offers suggestive evidence of a potential bias arising from the fact that household
heads are not selected randomly. The figure displays the income premium of household heads
as a function age, with the average income of heads of a given age expressed as the log ratio
of the average income of all individuals of that age. Both young and elderly household heads
are significantly richer than their non-household head counterparts. This is no surprise —
only the richer individuals can afford to live independently when young or in old age. If
high individual income is correlated with high individual saving rate, the household approach
would therefore tend to over-estimate the saving rates of the young and of the elderly. The
evolution of the income premium over time, apparent in the figure, suggests that the selection
bias is likely to be more severe for the elderly in 1992, and more severe for the young in 2009.
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Figure 3.3: Income Premium of Household Heads in China.
Notes: Income premium of household heads is the log difference between the average income of heads of a
given age and the average income of individuals of the same age. Source UHS (1992-2009).
28Any household with one adult or several adults belonging to the same generation, possibly with a child,
is considered as uni-generational. Children are defined as individuals aged less than 25 with no income.
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Projection Method. To improve upon the household approach, the key challenge is to iden-
tify individual consumption. Our approach applies a projection method proposed by Chesher
(1997, 1998) and Deaton and Paxton (2000) to disaggregate household consumption into indi-
vidual consumption, from which we estimate new age-saving profiles. Essentially, the idea is
to recover the consumption of each individual member of the household using cross-sectional
variations in the composition of households as a source of identification. In practice, this is
done by projecting household consumption on the number of household members belonging
to various age groups, controlling for observable household characteristics. Following Chesher
(1997), we conduct a non-linear least squares estimation of the following model for each year:
Ch = exp(γ.Zh)
(
99∑
j=19
cjNh,j
)
+ ǫh,
where Ch is the aggregate consumption of household h, Nh,j is the number of members of
age j in household h, and Zh denotes a set of household-specific controls (income group,
number of adults, number of children, uni- vs. multi-generational, etc.).29 The estimated
consumption of an individual of age j living in a household with characteristics Zh is then
equal to exp(γˆ.Zh)cˆj. Further details of the method are given in Appendix D.2, along with
a number of robustness checks. In particular, we estimated individual age-saving profiles
through an alternative method based on the restricted sample of uni-generational households
(more than 40% of the entire sample). This alternative approach, which uses a different
sample of households and a different identification strategy, yields very similar age-saving
profiles. We also applied both methods to estimate individual age-saving profiles from the
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey data, available for the years 1995 and
2002, finding consistent results across methods and across surveys.
Estimated Age-Saving Profiles for China. Figure 3.4 exhibits the estimated age-saving
profiles, at the beginning and at the end of the sample period.30 In Appendix D.2, we show
29This assumes that individual consumption can be written as multiplicatively separable functions of indi-
vidual age and household characteristics. The identification therefore relies on the restriction that the effect
of household characteristics on individual consumption is independent of age.
30By symmetry with the U.S., we show the Chinese age-saving profile for the year 2008, but estimates from
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that our estimates differ substantially from the ones produced by the household approach
based on the age of the household head. Echoing the results of Deaton and Paxton (2002)
for Taiwan and Thailand, we find that the age-saving profiles computed by the individual
approach are more in accord with the lifecycle theory of saving. In particular, the young do
save less than the middle-aged, especially so in the most recent period. Over time, we observe
a large increase in the saving rate of the middle-aged, between 15-20 percentage points, while
the saving rate of the youngest declines slightly. The striking increase in the saving rate of
the elderly (> 65) is quite peculiar and seems at odds with standard lifecyle motives.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated Age-Saving Profiles for China in 1992 (left panel, also showing the
average for 1986, 1992 and 1993) and 2008 (right panel), Individual Method.
Notes: UHS data. Saving rates are estimated using a projection method to identify individual consumption
(Chesher (1997)), controlling for household characteristics as described in Appendix D.2.
3.3 Summary of Micro Evidence
Our baseline three-period model predicts that in the face of a fall in the world interest rate
(caused by capital markets integration and fast growth in Asia), (i) the saving rate of the
young falls by more in developed countries than in emerging markets; (ii) the saving rate of
the middle-aged increases by more in emerging markets than in developed countries. As a
result, age-saving profiles across countries become more distant from each other over time. In
the data, the saving rate of the young did fall by about 10 percentage points more in the U.S.
the 2009 survey are very similar. For the beginning of the sample period, due to the lack of observations in
1988, we show the estimated profile for 1992 along with averages over the first three years of observations to
minimize issues related to the smaller size of our sample in early years.
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than in China, whereas the saving rate of the middle-aged (35-54) in China rose by about
15 percentage points more in China than in the U.S.. Within countries, the increase in the
saving rate of the middle-aged together with the fall in the saving rate of the young make
the profiles more hump-shaped, both in theory and in the data. Overall, apart from the large
increase in the saving rate of the elderly in China, our empirical findings appear to support
the qualitative predictions of our theory.
4 Quantitative Analysis
Equipped with facts on the macro and micro level, we now assess the ability of the model to
match the evolution of saving rates in the U.S. and China over the period 1988-2008, both
on the aggregate and by age groups. The quantitative model enriches the baseline model
of Section 2 along several dimensions, and is fully calibrated to the experiences of these
two economies. First, we increase the number of periods/generations in order to yield more
refined micro and aggregate predictions. Having more periods allows us to incorporate the
exact shapes of age-income profiles across countries, and their variations over time. Second,
we introduce a bequest motive to allow for a savings initiative by the old. The demographic
evolution in each country is also calibrated to the data — thus incorporating the aging of
population in both countries. Model parameters that are not directly observable are calibrated
to micro and macro data for the U.S. and China at the beginning of the sample period.
4.1 A Multi-Period OLG Model with Asymmetric Constraints
A brief description of the quantitative model follows. Unless specified otherwise, the notations
are retained from Section 2.
Preferences and Bequests. We consider agents whose economic life runs for J +1 periods.
Age is indexed by j = 0, ..., J . We let cij,t denote the consumption of an agent of age j in
period t and country i. In order to obtain a more realistic saving behavior for the old, we
augment our baseline model with a bequest motive along the lines of Abel (2001). The lifetime
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utility of an agent born in period t in country i is
U it =
J∑
j=0
βju(cij,t+j) + φβ
Ju(Rit+J+1b
i
t+J), (18)
where bit denotes the amount of bequest left in period t by an agent born in period t − J ,
and φ captures the strength of the bequest motive. Agents receive bequests at age J − ∆,
0 < ∆ < J , and bequests are shared equally among offsprings.31 Thus the amount of bequest
qit+J−∆ received by an agent born in period t is related to b
i
t+J−∆ as follows
qit+J−∆ =
Lit−∆
Lit
bit+J−∆, (19)
where Lit denotes the size of the generation born in period t, so that L
i
t/L
i
t−∆ captures the
number of children (born in period t) per agent born in period t−∆.
Production. The production sector is analogous to the one in the qualitative model. Gross
output in country i is
Y it = (K
i
t)
α
[
Ait
J∑
j=1
eij,tL
i
t−j
]1−α
= AitL¯
i
t(k
i
t)
α, (20)
where L¯it ≡
∑J
j=0 e
i
j,tL
i
t−j denotes the total efficiency-weighted population, and k
i
t = K
i
t/(A
i
tL¯
i
t)
denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The efficiency weights {eij,t}
J
j=0 capture the shape of
the age-income profile in period t and country i. Indeed, the competitive wage received by
agent of age j in country i in period t is wij,t = e
i
j,t(1 − α)A
i
t(k
i
t)
α. The gross rate of return
between t− 1 and t is Rit = 1− δ + α(k
i
t)
α−1.
Credit Constraints. Consider the intertemporal problem of a consumer born in period t
and country i. This agent faces a sequence of gross rates of return {Rit+j+1}
J
j=0 and labor
income {wij,t+j}
J
j=0, and receives bequest q
i
t+J−∆. Let a
i
j,t+j denote his end-of-period net asset
31Under the assumption that (i) agents remain in childhood for H periods before they start their economic
life and (ii) that they procreate at age P , then ∆ = H + P .
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holdings at age j. Flow budget constraints are
cij,t+j + a
i
j,t+j = R
i
t+ja
i
j−1,t+j−1 + w
i
j,t + 1{j=J−∆}q
i
t+J−∆, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, (21)
ciJ,t+J + b
i
t+J = R
i
t+Ja
i
J−1,t+J−1 + w
i
J,t+J , (22)
with ai−1,t−1 = 0. Define the discounted present value of current and future labor income
H ij,t = w
i
j,t +
J−j∑
τ=1
wij+τ,t+τ∏τ
s=1R
i
t+s
, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, (23)
and H iJ,t = w
i
J,t. The credit constraint faced by the agent at age j ≤ J − 1 is
aij,t+j ≥ −θ
i
H ij+1,t+j+1
Rit+j+1
. (24)
Equilibrium. As described in Appendix B, one can solve for the autarkic and integrated
steady-states of the model, as well as its transitory dynamics for a given evolution of produc-
tivity, demographics and efficiency parameters. In autarky, the model equilibrium is given
by a path for the capital-effective-labor ratio kit and bequests (q
i
t, b
i
t) such that: (i) all agents
maximize their intertemporal utility (Eq. 18) with respect to their consumption decisions,
subject to their sequence of budget constraints (Eqs. 21-22) and credit constraints (Eq. 24);
(ii) the consistency condition (Eq. 19) between bequests received and bequests left is satis-
fied; (iii) the market for capital clears at every date. Under financial integration, a similar
definition of an equilibrium holds, with the market for capital clearing globally. When solving
for equilibrium, the presence of bequests adds a layer of complexity since the paths of capital
and bequests have to be determined together in a dynamic fixed point problem. A detailed
description of the numerical solution method is provided in the appendix.
28
4.2 Calibration
Two economies are considered in the quantitative analysis, the U.S. and China, i ∈ {US,CH}.
Each period lasts 10 years and agents live for 6 periods (J = 5). Empirically, the six age groups
map into the following age brackets: under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and above 65. We
simulate the model under a scenario similar to the one analyzed in the experiment of Section
2.6. Specifically, China grows faster over four consecutive periods, from period −2 to period
2 (corresponding to 1968-2008), and integrates with the U.S. in period 0 (i.e, 1988) after two
periods of accelerated growth. The calibration methodology is the same as before—albeit
more comprehensive, and applied to the U.S. and China rather than Advanced economies and
Emerging Asia. Table 2 provides a complete summary of our calibration.
Table 2: Calibration Summary.
Age-Income Profile (eij,t) <25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >65
U.S. 0.33 0.75 0.95 1.00 0.68 0.12
China 1968-88 0.61 0.95 1.06 1.00 0.44 0.07
1998 0.62 0.97 1.15 1.00 0.28 0.06
2008-18 0.73 1.27 1.35 1.00 0.33 0.03
steady state 0.33 0.75 0.95 1.00 0.68 0.12
Demographic Growth (giL,t) pre-1968 1968-78 1978-88 1988-98 98-2008 post-2008
(% per year) U.S. 1.5 1.5 -1.0 0.5 3.0 1.0
China 3.0 2.0 3.0 -2.0 1.5 1.0
Productivity Growth (giA,t) pre-1968 1968-78 1978-88 1988-98 98-2008 post-2008
(% per year) U.S. 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
China 1.5 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 1.5
Other Parameters
Share of capital (α) 0.28 Depreciation rate (δ), annual basis 0.10
e.i.s. coefficient (σ) 0.5 Discount factor (β), annual basis 0.955
Bequest motive (φ) 0.03 Constraint parameters (θUS , θCH) 0.24, 0
Demographics. The age distribution for each country and its evolution over time are ob-
tained from the World Population Prospects data, sampled every decade since 1970 (United
Nations, 2010 revision).32 For each country, the demographic growth rate before 1970 and the
sequence of growth rates giL,t post-1970 are chosen to best fit the observed age distributions
32Data availability limits us to set the demographic structure in 1968 (resp. 1978 up to 2008) to the one
measured in the data for the year 1970 (resp. 1980 up to 2010).
29
Table 3: Demographic Structure in the U.S. and China.
Model-implied demographic structure vs. data from World Population Prospects (United Nations, 2010).
1968 1988 2008
U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China
Share of young (15-34) Data 41.6 52.5 39.5 52.1 32.8 38.1
(% of population above 15) Model 43.6 53.8 40.5 51.3 38.8 38.6
Share of middle-aged (35-54) Data 31.8 31.3 31.2 29.5 33.2 37.9
(% of population above 15) Model 32.4 29.8 34.1 31.3 33.2 38.1
Share of above 55 Data 26.5 16.2 29.3 18.4 34.0 24.0
(% of population above 15) Model 24.0 16.5 25.3 17.3 28.0 23.3
from 1970 to 2010. The model does not have enough degrees of freedom to perfectly match
the data, and we target more specifically the share of the middle age groups (35-44 and 45-54)
as they contribute the most to aggregate saving. Nonetheless, our calibration produces a close
match to the overall demographic structure, as shown in Table 3.33 Implied demographic
growth rates are reported in Table 2. The main feature of the data is the large fall in popula-
tion growth in China starting in 1990, largely a result of fertility controls (one-child policy),
and the ensuing rapid aging of the population (see Table 3). Post 2008, the population growth
rate is assumed to be 1% in both countries.34
Age-Income Profiles. The relative efficiency parameters (eij,t) are calibrated to the wage
income profile (net of taxes) across age groups, as observed in the UHS data for China (starting
in 1992) and in the CEX for the U.S. (starting in 1988). Figure 4.1 depicts wage income
profiles measured for the initial year of observations in our data and for the year 2008, with
the efficiency parameter for age group 45-54 normalized to unity. In the U.S., coefficients
are remarkably stable over time. We therefore set U.S. efficiency parameters eUSj,t equal to
their average values over 1988-2008 in every period.35 Compared to the U.S., the Chinese
33Our calibration matches fairly well the proportion of middle-aged in the U.S. at the expense of understating
the aging of the country over the period 1970-2010, which is largely driven by individuals above 75 whose
share has significantly increased. If one considers only individuals between 15 and 75, which is the relevant
counterpart to our model, the match between model and data is very accurate.
34This corresponds to the average population growth rate in the U.S. since 1970. We assume that the
one-child policy in China will remain at least partially in place—leading to a low population growth, in line
with the most recent years.
35We only observe a slight flattening of the U.S. age-income profile after age 55 in the recent period. Since
this change is quantitatively small, our results are not affected if we take into account time variation in the
U.S. income profile. We set it constant in our benchmark calibration to eliminate one possible source of change
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Figure 4.1: Income Profiles for the U.S. and China.
Notes: Average income of a given age group divided by average income of the reference group (age 45-54).
Income is the sum of wage and self-business income net of taxes from CEX (1988 and 2008) for the U.S. and
UHS (1992 and 2008) for China.
profile reaches its peak earlier (at age 35-44) and falls more steeply in old age. This feature is
particularly striking in the more recent period, due to a marked increase in relative wages for
the 25-34 and 35-44 age brackets. For periods t = 0, 1, 2, we set eCHj,t to the values observed in
the data for the years 1992, 1998 and 2008, respectively. Owing to data limitations, relative
efficiency parameters in earlier periods are set equal to their values in period 0. Going forward,
we assume that relative efficiency parameters in China remain equal to their 2008 values for
one period before converging to the steady state level of the U.S. gradually in four periods.
Initial Conditions and Productivity Growth. Given the calibrated population growth
rates and income profiles, initial relative productivity levels and subsequent productivity
growth rates are set to match the output of China relative to the U.S. over the period 1968-
2008, and to allow the capital-effective-labor ratio in China to reach about 70% of that of the
U.S. in 1988, per Hall and Jones (1999). The resulting annual productivity growth rate for
China is 3.6% between 1968-78, and 4.5% between 1978-2008. We assume that U.S. produc-
tivity grows at an annual rate of 1.5% throughout, and that China grows at the same rate
after 2008. Such differences in productivity growth across countries may seem small compared
to observed real GDP growth differentials between the U.S. and China (5% on average over
1978-2008), but a significant part of Chinese growth in our experiment is driven by increasing
in age-saving profiles and facilitate the interpretation of our results.
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inputs, i.e. labor (increasing share of middle-aged workers, who are the most productive) and
capital, and by increased efficiency of workers in the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups.
Other Calibrated Parameters. We use α = 0.28 for the share of labor in value added,
corresponding to the average share of labor income in the U.S. over the period 1988-2008.36
The depreciation rate is set to 10% on an annual basis. The remaining parameters are the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ, the discount factor β, the bequest parameter φ,
and the credit constraint parameters θi. These parameters are chosen so as to minimize the
discrepancy between empirical and model-implied saving behavior, at both the macro and
micro levels, in the integration period. Specifically, let si0 and s
i
j,0 denote the model-implied
aggregate saving rate and the saving rate of agents of age j in country i in the integration
period, and let si,d0 and s
i,d
j,0 denote their counterparts in the data. We search over a large grid
the vector of parameter values ψ ≡
[
σ, β, φ, θUS, θCH
]
that minimizes the distance
∑
i
∣∣∣si0(ψ)− si,d0 ∣∣∣+∑
i
J∑
j=0
ωij
(
sij,0(ψ)− s
i,d
j,0
)2
,
where the weights ωij on different age groups in country i satisfy
∑J
j=1 ω
i
j = 1 and reflect their
shares in the total effective population L¯i0.
37 The optimal parameter values are described in
Table 2. Values of 0.5 for σ and 0.955 for β are in the range of empirical estimates. Other
parameter values are more difficult to gauge. Credit constraint parameters are found to be
very different across countries (θCH = 0, θUS = 0.24). In the data, the household debt-to-GDP
ratio in China is about 1/9 of that in the U.S. in 2007, suggesting indeed very large differences
in household access to credit. Although our calibration procedure yields θCH = 0, the results
are not very sensitive to the value of θCH provided that it is an order of magnitude smaller
than θUS.
36We use OECD Quarterly National Accounts data, correcting for mixed income as in Gollin (2002).
37We adopt absolute deviations for the macro variables instead of squared differences. Otherwise the opti-
mization would only weight micro outcomes since micro discrepancies are on average much larger than macro
ones. The grid of parameter values is described in Appendix B.
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4.3 Results
We now present the results for our benchmark calibration. When evaluating the performance
of the model, it is important to keep in mind that some key parameters are calibrated to
match savings data at the date of integration, without using post-1990 data.
On the aggregate level, the qualitative implications of the three-period model are broadly
preserved (Figure 4.2). Quantitatively, the aggregate saving rate increases sharply in China
(+6.3 percentage points between t = 0 and t = 2, i.e., 1988-2008), while falling significantly in
the U.S. (−2.9 percentage points over the same period). The model explains more than 40%
of the savings divergence observed in the data. At the time of opening, China runs a small
current account deficit, due to a growth-driven investment boom, before turning into a large
surplus: the current account moves from −2.2% of GDP to +6.5% between 1988 and 2008.
In the data, China indeed ran current account deficits in the 1990s (and so did other Asian
countries, to an even greater extent) before moving into a surplus. Our model predicts such a
pattern as the standard neoclassical forces (capital flowing towards the capital-scarce and fast
growing economy) dominate initially when China is still relatively small. But as its relative
size in the world economy rapidly increases, the world interest rate drops significantly, and
the contrasting responses of saving rates across countries lead to a reversal in current account
positions.
Turning to micro-level predictions, Figure 4.3 juxtaposes the model-implied age-saving
profiles in 1988 (t = 0) and 2008 (t = 2) with those estimated from the data. For the U.S.,
the model matches the increasing spread in the saving rates of the young (under 25) and
middle-aged (35-54) observed in the data over two decades. The model nevertheless slightly
overpredicts the fall in the young’s saving rate and the rise in the middle-aged saving rate.
It also fails to account for the saving rate of the old in 1988. For China, the model provides
a reasonably good fit to the relatively flat age-saving profile observed at the beginning of
the period. Over the subsequent two decades, the model-implied saving rates for individuals
between 25-54 rise substantially, although by less than in the data. Interestingly, the model
implies a large increase in saving rates for those of age 25-34 and 35-44 (by about 10 percentage
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Figure 4.2: Quantitative Results: Aggregate Dynamics.
Notes: Benchmark calibration displayed in Table 2.
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Figure 4.3: Quantitative Results: Age-Saving Profiles.
Notes: Benchmark calibration displayed in Table 2. Details on the construction of empirical profiles are
provided in Section 3. Averages over the years 1986, 1992 and 1993 are used for China in 1988.
points), capturing about 50 percent of the particularly pronounced rise observed in the data
for these age groups. As for young individuals (under 25), the model predicts a constant
saving rate as the credit constraint is binding in every period — in line with the data and
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in contrast to the U.S.. As a result, the model captures the increasing discrepancy between
the saving rates of the very young and the middle-aged over time. At the other end of the
age-saving profile however, the model is unable to explain the large increase in the saving
rate of the elderly. To summarize, our model can with one mechanism explain a significant
portion of the rise in saving rates for most age groups in China, and the simultaneous increase
in borrowing of the young in the U.S.. The shapes of the profiles generated by the model are
broadly in line with the data, with the exception of the oldest age group — particularly in
China.
4.4 Alternative Calibrations and Sensitivity Analysis
To provide further intuition on the channels driving the dynamics of savings across countries
and age groups, we now examine the output of the model under alternative calibrations.
In particular, we investigate the role played by the asymmetry of credit constraints and the
shape of income profiles. We also assess the quantitative contribution of changes in the Chinese
income profile and of fast aging in China. For the sake of brevity, we display graphically only
variables that exhibit significant changes relative to our benchmark calibration.
Symmetric Credit Constraints. We first investigate the quantitative role of credit con-
straint heterogeneity by setting all credit constraint parameters to the U.S. level, while keeping
all other parameters constant. Results for the variables of interest are shown in Figure 4.4.
Upon integration, the aggregate saving rate falls substantially in China while increasing in
the U.S.. China experiences a very large current account deficit (-10.5%) at the time of open-
ing, before turning into a surplus. On the micro level, age-saving profiles for China are also
markedly different from our benchmark calibration. In particular, the 1988 profile exhibits a
much more pronounced inverted-U shape, given the massive borrowing of the young Chinese
households in anticipation of faster growth.38 Simulations of the model in the absence of any
credit constraints yield very similar, counterfactual results, thus affirming the importance of
both the presence of credit constraints and their being tighter in China for our findings.
38Similarly in 2008, the saving rates of individuals below 45 are significantly below those in our benchmark.
35
−1 0 1 2 3 4
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Aggregate saving rate
 
 
US
CH
−1 0 1 2 3 4
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
CA/GDP
 
 
US
CH
<25 25−34 35−44 45−54 55−64 >65−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Age groups
Age−saving profile, China 1988
 
 
model
data
Figure 4.4: Alternative Calibration: Symmetric Credit Constraints.
Notes: Chinese and U.S. credit constraint parameters are set to their U.S. value (θUS = θCH = 0.24). All
other parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
Flat Age-Income Profiles. We next demonstrate the importance of the shape of the in-
come profile. The experiment sets relative efficiency parameters to unity at all ages in both
countries, while keeping all other parameters at their benchmark values. As in the previous
experiment, fast-growing China sees a large fall in aggregate savings and a massive current
account deficit (Figure 4.5). There are two aspects of the shape of the calibrated age-income
profiles that matter for our results. The downward-sloping part of the profile gives stronger
saving motives to the middle-aged, and at the same time limits the wealth effect of growth.
The upward-sloping part of the profile is even more crucial as credit constraints only matter
to the extent that younger individuals have a desire to borrow. With flat age-income profiles,
credit constraints are not binding in any country in the steady state (despite aggregate pro-
ductivity growth), thus bringing the model dynamics very close to a frictionless neoclassical
representative agent model. More generally, this experiment illustrates the dynamics induced
by a growth shock in a model where most agents have a desire to save in the steady state.39
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Figure 4.5: Alternative Calibration: Flat Age-Income Profiles.
Notes: Chinese and U.S. efficiency parameters are set to unity at all dates and all ages (eijt = 1 for all j). All
other parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
39However such a model could still produce an increase in savings in a fast-growing country if the saving
motive happens to be stronger upon fast growth, as pointed out in Carroll and Jeanne (2009).
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Contribution of Changes in Income Profile in China. As noted in Section 4.2, the age-
income profile in China changed significantly over time. Towards the end of the sample period,
the income profile reaches a higher peak at a younger age and falls more steeply in old age (see
Figure 4.1). By providing further incentives to save for retirement and by reducing wealth
effects for middle-aged consumers, this evolution contributes to the rise in Chinese savings. We
assess the quantitative importance of this channel by keeping the relative efficiency parameters
in China (eCHj,t ) equal to their initial values until 2018. All other parameters remain at their
benchmark values. Figure 4.6 depicts the evolution of macro variables of interest, along with
the 2008 Chinese age-savings profile. Compared to our benchmark, aggregate savings and
current account surplus in China rise less over the period 1988-2008 (by 1.2% and 60bps,
respectively), due to a smaller increase in the middle-aged’s saving rates over the period. As
a consequence, the fall in interest rate is reduced.
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Figure 4.6: Quantitative Results with Time-Invariant Income Profiles.
Notes: In the ‘alternative’ calibration, Chinese relative efficiency parameters are set to their initial value until
2018. All other parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
Contribution of Fast Aging in Asia. Starting from the early seventies, China experienced
a very fast demographic transition due to the implementation of the one-child policy. Our
benchmark experiment takes this evolution into account. We investigate its quantitative role
by running an experiment where demographic growth in China remains at 3% per year until
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2018 (an extreme scenario where the fertility rate stays identical to its 1968 value) before
converging to its steady-state value of 1%. All other parameters values are kept to their
benchmark values. Results for the evolution of macro variables, displayed in Figure 4.7, are
not very different from our benchmark simulation.40 Aggregate savings in China increase at
a slower pace in the two decades following integration, while the interest rate decreases by
less over that period. Indeed in the absence of a demographic transition, the share of middle-
aged savers does not increase. As a result of this composition effect, the extent of the rise
in savings in China (and the fall in the world interest rate) is therefore smaller compared to
our benchmark simulation. Higher demographic growth also limits the fall in interest rates
by raising the marginal productivity of capital. These effects tend to dominate in the short
run — but in the long run, as China reaches an even greater weight in the world economy,
the world interest rate falls further, causing a larger divergence in savings.
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Figure 4.7: Quantitative Results with Delayed Demographic Transition in China.
Notes: In the ‘alternative’ calibration, demographic growth in China is set to its initial value of 3% until 2018.
All other parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a lifecycle theory of savings in large open economies with heterogenous
levels of household credit constraints. We show that faster growth in (more constrained)
emerging markets can lead to a divergence in household saving rates across developed and
emerging economies, as well as a persistent decline in the world interest rate. The theory
provides, with a single mechanism, micro-foundations to the global saving glut (Bernanke
40The change in demography has little impact on age-savings profiles.
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(2005)) and a potential answer to the “allocation puzzle” (Gourinchas and Jeanne (2011)). The
age-saving profiles estimated from U.S. and China’s survey data are broadly consistent with the
lifecycle hypothesis, and at the same time lend empirical support to our theoretical predictions
on the contrasting evolution of saving profiles between these two economies. A quantitative
version of the model calibrated to macro and micro data for the U.S. and China can explain
more than 40% of the divergence in their aggregate household saving rates and a substantial
share of the evolution of saving rates across age-groups in both countries. Our model however
falls short of explaining the full extent of the “Chinese saving puzzle” (Modigliani and Cao
(2004)).
In examining micro-level evidence for China, we point out the biases that may arise from
employing household-level data to estimate age-specific saving behavior. Our endeavors to
correct for these biases allow us to establish new empirical facts. The novel evidence we
provide, along with remaining discrepancies between data and theory, can potentially form
the basis for future research. In particular, the saving behavior of the old in China warrants
further study. Plausible explanations for their puzzling behavior, not considered in this model,
include the evolution of pension systems and health insurance or changes in life expectancy.
Finally, our theory can be easily applied to a larger cross-section of countries, thus providing
an additional dimension for assessing its performance in accounting for savings and current
account patterns across countries.
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Figures for the Introduction. See Appendix C.1 for data description
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider a country i characterized by θi. Note that for δ = 1, we
have Rit = α (k
i
t)
1−α
. The law of motion for kit is implicitly given by:
kit+1 + β
−σα1−σ
(
kit+1
)α(1−σ)+σ
=
(1− θi)(1− α)
(1 + giA,t+1)(1 + g
i
L,t)
{
1 + eit+1(1 + g
i
L,t+1) + θ
i 1−α
α
} (kit)α .
If a steady-state level of capital ki exists, it therefore satisfies
ki + β−σα1−σ
(
ki
)α(1−σ)+σ
=
(1− θi)(1− α)
(1 + gA)(1 + gL)
{
1 + e(1 + gL) + θi
1−α
α
} (ki)α .
Substituting the steady-state gross rate of return Ri = α (ki)
1−α
, we can write
1 + β−σ
(
Ri
)1−σ
= C
(
θi
)
Ri,
with C (θ) = (1−α)(1−θ)
(1+gA)(1+gL){α[1+e(1+gL)]+θ(1−α)}
. Note in particular that ∂C/∂θ < 0. If σ = 1, the
steady-state exists, is unique, and satisfies
Ri =
1 + β
βC (θi)
= (1 + gA)(1 + gL)
1 + β
β
α[1 + e(1 + gL)] + θ
i(1− α)
(1− α) (1− θi)
.
For σ < 1, Ri is such that vθi(R
i) = 0, where vθ(R) ≡ 1 + β
−σR1−σ − C (θ)R for R > 0. We
now show that vθ(R) = 0 has a unique solution. Differentiating vθ with respect to R, we get
∂vθ
∂R
= β−σ (1− σ)R−σ − C (θ) ,
which implies the following equivalence:
∂vθ
∂R
≥ 0 ⇔ R ≤
1
β
(1− σ)
1
σ C (θ)−
1
σ .
Hence vθ is increasing forR ∈]0;
1
β
(1− σ)
1
σ C (θ)−
1
σ ] and decreasing forR ≥ 1
β
(1− σ)
1
σ C (θ)−
1
σ .
We also have lim0 vθ(R) = 1 > 0 and lim∞ vθ(R) = −∞. Since vθ is a continuous function, it
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follows that vθ(R) = 0 has a unique solution, R(θ). This is our first result. We also note in
passing that our characterization of vθ implies
R < R(θ)⇐⇒ vθ(R) > 0. (A-1)
We now show that countries with a higher θ have a higher rate of return in autarky steady
state. Consider θi < θj and let Ri = R(θi) (resp. Rj = R(θj)) denote the well-defined solution
to vθi(R
i) = 0 (resp. vθj(R
j) = 0). For any R > 0, we can write
vθj(R)− vθi(R) =
(
C
(
θi
)
− C
(
θj
))
R > 0,
where the first equality follows from the definition of vθ, and the inequality follows from
∂C/∂θ < 0. In particular, for R = Ri, we have vθj(R
i) − vθi(R
i) = vθj(R
i) > 0, which by
remark (A-1) above, is equivalent to Ri < Rj. We therefore have shown that
θi < θj ⇐⇒ Ri < Rj.
This establishes our second result, ∂Ri/∂θi > 0, and the fact that dki/dθi < 0 follows imme-
diately. It is worthwhile to note that the theorem also holds for σ > 1. Our proof naturally
extends to that case.
Proof of Proposition 1: For δ = 1 and any σ ≤ 1, one can easily show that the steady
state world interest rate R satisfies
F (R) =
∑
i
λi(1− θi)∑
j
λj(1− θj)
F (Ri), (A-2)
where F (x) ≡ x/ (1 + β−σx1−σ) and Ri denotes the autarky steady state interest rate in
country i. The bounds on R in (14) follow from F ′(.) > 0. Note that the proposition also
holds for σ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: The result follows immediately from Equation (A-2).
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B Technical Appendix
This appendix provides further details on the setup, solution method, and variable definitions
for the quantitative model of Section 4, which embeds the three-period version of Section 2.
The definitions given in Section B.6 apply straightforwardly to the three-period case. In that
subsection, we derive the formulas for savings by age displayed in Section 2.5.
We consider agents whose economic life runs for J + 1 periods. Age is indexed by j =
0, ..., J . We let cij,t denote the consumption of an agent of age j in period t and country i. In
order to obtain a more realistic savings behavior for the old, we introduce a bequest motive
along the lines of Abel (2001). The lifetime utility of an agent born in period t in country i is
U it =
J∑
j=0
βju(cij,t+j) + φβ
Ju(Rit+J+1b
i
t+J), (B-1)
where bit denotes the amount of bequest left in period t by an agent born in period t − J ,
and φ captures the strength of the bequest motive. Agents receive bequests at age J − ∆,
0 < ∆ < J , and bequests are shared equally among offsprings.41 Thus the amount of bequest
qit+J−∆ received by an agent born in period t is related to b
i
t+J−∆ as follows
qit+J−∆ =
Lit−∆
Lit
bit+J−∆ ≡
bit+J−∆
nit
, (B-2)
where Lit denotes the size of the generation born in period t and n
i
t denotes the number of
children (born in period t) per agent born in period t−∆. Gross output in country i is
Y it = (K
i
t)
α
[
Ait
J∑
j=1
eij,tL
i
t−j
]1−α
= AitL¯
i
t(k
i
t)
α, (B-3)
where L¯it ≡
∑J
j=0 e
i
j,tL
i
t−j denotes the total efficiency-weighted population, and k
i
t = K
i
t/(A
i
tL¯
i
t)
denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The set of efficiency weights {eij,t}
J
j=0 captures the
shape of the age-income profile in period t and country i. Indeed, the labor income received
41Under the assumption that (i) agents remain in childhood for H periods before they start their economic
life and (ii) that they procreate at age P , then ∆ = H + P .
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by agent of age j in country i in period t is wij,t = e
i
j,t(1−α)A
i
t(k
i
t)
α ≡ eij,tw
i
t. Finally the gross
rate of return between t− 1 and t is
Rit = 1− δ + r
i
K,t = 1− δ + α(k
i
t)
α−1. (B-4)
B.1 Individual Optimization
Consider the consumption-saving problem of an agent born in period t and country i. This
agent faces a sequence of gross rates of return {Rit+j+1}
J
j=0 and labor income {w
i
j,t+j}
J
j=0, and
receives bequest qit+J−∆. Let a
i
j,t+j denote his end-of-period net asset holdings at age j. Flow
budget constraints are
cij,t+j + a
i
j,t+j = R
i
t+ja
i
j−1,t+j−1 + w
i
j,t + 1{j=J−∆}q
i
t+J−∆, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, (B-5)
ciJ,t+J + b
i
t+J = R
i
t+Ja
i
J−1,t+J−1 + w
i
J,t+J , (B-6)
with ai−1,t−1 = 0. Define the discounted present value of current and future labor income
H ij,t ≡ w
i
j,t +
J−j∑
τ=1
wij+τ,t+τ∏τ
s=1R
i
t+s
, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, (B-7)
H iJ,t ≡ w
i
J,t. (B-8)
The credit constraint faced by the agent at age j ≤ J − 1 is
aij,t+j ≥ −θ
i
H ij+1,t+j+1
Rit+j+1
. (B-9)
B.2 Autarky Steady State
Consider a steady state for country i where eij,t = e
i
j for all t, productivity grows at constant
rate giA, and L
i
t+1 = (1 + g
i
L)L
i
t, implying n
i
t = (1 + g
i
L)
∆ for all t. Let ki denote the autarky
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steady state level of k in country i,
Kit
AitL¯
i
t
= ki.
The age-income profile is given by wij,t = e
i
jw
i
t, where w
i
t = (1 − α)A
i
t(k
i)α. Thus an agent
born in period t faces the wage sequence {wij,t+j}
J
j=0 with
wij,t+j = e
i
jw
i
t+j = e
i
j(1 + g
i
A)
jwit = w˜
i
jw
i
t, (B-10)
where w˜ij ≡ e
i
j(1 + g
i
A)
j. Taking the steady state value of the gross rate of return Ri as
given, consider the stationary individual optimization problem with normalized labor income
sequence {w˜ij}
J
j=0. For a given value of received bequest q, let {a˜
i
j(q)}
J
j=0 denote the optimal
path of wealth for an agent in country i, and b˜i(q) the amount of bequest left by this agent.
Define q˜i(Ri) the value of q such that
q =
1
[(1 + giL)(1 + g
i
A)]
∆
b˜i(q), (B-11)
and let a˜ij ≡ a˜
i
j(q˜
i). Stationarity and homogeneity imply that, at steady state in country i,
the wealth at age j of an agent born in period t is aij,t+j = a˜
i
jw
i
t.
The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
Kit+1 ≡ A
i
t+1L¯
i
t+1k
i =
J−1∑
j=0
Lit−ja
i
j,t. (B-12)
Using the fact that aij,t = a˜
i
jw
i
t/(1 + g
i
A)
j along with Lit+1 = (1 + g
i
L)L
i
t, the market clearing
condition can be rewritten as
(
J∑
j=0
eij
(1 + giL)
j
)
(ki)1−α = (1− α)
J−1∑
j=0
a˜ij(k
i)
[(1 + giL)(1 + g
i
A)]
j+1
, (B-13)
where the notation a˜ij(k
i) makes explicit the dependence of the path of net asset positions on
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the steady state rate of return. Equation (B-13) implicitly defines the steady-state level of
the capital-effective-labor ratio.
B.3 Integrated Steady State
Consider an integrated steady state where eij,t = ej for all i and t, productivity grows at
constant rate gA, and L
i
t+1 = (1 + gL)L
i
t, implying n
i
t = (1 + gL)
∆ for all i and t. At steady
state,
Kit
AitL¯
i
t
= k.
Now the income profile by age is given by wij,t = ejw
i
t, where w
i
t = (1 − α)A
i
tk
α. Hence an
agent born in period t faces the wage sequence {wij,t+j}
J
j=0 with
wij,t+j = ejw
i
t+j = ej(1 + gA)
jwit ≡ w˜jw
i
t. (B-14)
The integrated steady state can be determined along the same logic as for the autarky
steady state. First, taking the steady state value of the gross rate of return R as given,
we consider the stationary individual optimization problem with normalized labor income
sequence {w˜j}
J
j=0. For a given value of received bequest q, let {a˜
i
j(q)}
J
j=0 denote the optimal
path of wealth for an agent in country i, and b˜i(q) the amount of bequest left by this agent.
Define q˜i(R) the value of q such that
q =
1
[(1 + gL)(1 + gA)]∆
b˜i(q), (B-15)
and let a˜ij ≡ a˜
i
j(q˜
i). Stationarity and homogeneity imply that, at the integrated steady state,
the wealth at age j of an agent born in period t in country i is aij,t+j = a˜
i
jw
i
t.
The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 ≡ k
∑
i
Ait+1L¯
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J−1∑
j=0
Lit−ja
i
j,t. (B-16)
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Let λi ≡ AitL
i
t/(
∑
hA
h
tL
h
t ) denote the constant share of country i in world effective labor. The
market clearing condition can be rewritten as
(
J∑
j=0
ej
(1 + gL)j
)
k1−α = (1− α)
J−1∑
j=0
∑
i λ
ia˜ij(k)
[(1 + gL)(1 + gA)]j+1
. (B-17)
B.4 Dynamics
The law of motion for kt ≡ (k
i
t)
N
i=1 depends on whether countries are financially integrated
or in financial autarky. If countries are closed financially in period t, the market clearing
condition in country i is
Ait+1L¯
i
t+1k
i
t+1 =
J−1∑
j=0
Lit−ja
i
j,t. (B-18)
The generations who matter in period t are those born in periods t − J + 1 to t. It is then
immediate to show that market clearing in period t pins down kit+1 given
• lagged values KiL,t+1 ≡ {k
i
t−J+1, ..., k
i
t} and future values K
i
F,t+1 ≡ {k
i
t+2, ..., k
i
t+J+1},
• bequests Qit+1 ≡ {q
i
τ}
t
τ=t+1−∆,
• productivity sequence {Aiτ}
t+J
τ=t−J+1,
• evolution of demographics, i.e., {Liτ}
t
τ=t−J+1,
• evolution of age-income profile, i.e., {eij,τ+j}
J
j=0 for τ = t− J + 1, ..., t.
Note that bequests {qiτ}
t+J−∆
τ=t+1 are determined along with k
i
t+1.
If instead countries are financially integrated in period t, then rates of return are equalized
across countries
Rit+1 = Rt+1, for all i,
and so are their capital-effective-labor ratios
kit+1 ≡ K
i
t+1/(A
i
t+1L¯
i
t+1) = kt+1, for all i.
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The market clearing condition in period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 ≡ kt+1
∑
i
Ait+1L¯
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J−1∑
j=0
Lit−ja
i
j,t. (B-19)
It is immediate to show that market clearing in period t pins down kt+1 given
• lagged and future values, KL,t+1 ≡ {kτ}
t
τ=t−J+1 and KF,t+1 ≡ {kτ}
t+J+1
τ=t+2 ,
• bequests Qt+1 ≡ {qτ}
t
τ=t+1−∆, where qτ = (q
i
τ )
N
i=1,
• productivity sequence {Aiτ}
t+J
τ=t−J+1 for i = 1, ..., N ,
• evolution of demographics, i.e., {Liτ}
t
τ=t−J+1 for i = 1, ..., N ,
• evolution of age-income profile, i.e., {eij,τ+j}
J
j=0 for τ = t− J + 1, ..., t and i = 1, ..., N .
B.5 Simulations
In our main experiment, we consider a situation where countries start in financial autarky
and integrate in period X (we set X = 0 in the paper). Hence for t ≥ X + 1, kit = kt, for
all i. Around the integration period, we also feed the model with “shocks” to productivity,
demography, and age-income profiles. We allow for shocks over the window [X − τ,X + τ ].
All shocks are perfectly anticipated. In order to determine how the global economy responds
to financial integration and other contemporaneous shocks, we use the following algorithm.
1. We assume each country starts at its autarkic steady state, and that the economy does
not react to future shocks before period X − T , for T > τ large. That is, kit = k
i∗ for
t ≤ X − T − 1. The initial steady state for country i is determined by country specific
parameters θi, along with (giL, g
i
A) and {e
i
j}
J
j=0, as described in Section B.2. From the
initial steady state, we obtain bequests qit for t ≤ X − T − 1, which gives us Q
i
X−T .
2. We assume the global economy has converged to its integrated steady state k∗ in period
X + T + 1. That is, kt = k
∗ for t ≥ X + T + 1. The final steady state is determined
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by {θi}Ni=1, along with (gL, gA), {ej}
J
j=0 and final relative weights {λ
i}, as described in
Section B.3.
3. We then determine the transition path {kt}
X+T
t=X−T iteratively as follows.
• We start with a guess {k
(0)
t }
X+T
t=X−T . We set k
i(0)
t = k
i∗ for t ≤ X and k
i(0)
t = k
∗ for
all i for t ≥ X + 1.
• For n ≥ 0, given the path {k
(n)
t }
X+T
t=X−T , the updated path {k
(n+1)
t }
X+T
t=X−T is ob-
tained as follows. First, we obtain {k
(n+1)
t }
X
t=X−T by iterating on the autarkic
forward-backward difference equation (FBDE) in each country (see Section B.4).
Specifically, for each country i,
– We compute k
i(n+1)
X−T as the solution to the autarkic FBDE, given K
i(n)
L,X−T ,
K
i(n)
F,X−T and Q
i
X−T . Along with k
i(n+1)
X−T , we get q
i(n+1)
X−T .
– We compute k
i(n+1)
X−T+1 as the solution to the autarkic FBDE, given K
i(n)
L,X−T+1,
K
i(n)
F,X−T+1 and given past bequests Q
i
X−T+1 = (q
i(n)
X−T−2, q
i(n)
X−T−1, q
i(n+1)
X−T ). Along
with k
i(n+1)
X−T+1, we get q
i(n+1)
X−T+1 which is later used for computing k
i(n+1)
X−T+2.
– We repeat the previous steps until we have determined k
i(n+1)
X .
Then, we determine the common path {k
(n+1)
t }
X+t
t=X+1 by iterating on the integrated
FBDE. Specifically:
– We compute k
(n+1)
X+1 as the solution to the integrated FBDE given K
(n)
L,X+1,
K
(n)
F,X+1 and past bequests (q
(n+1)
X−2 ,q
(n+1)
X−1 ,q
(n+1)
X ). Along with k
(n+1)
X+1 , we get
q
(n+1)
X+1 which is used for computing k
(n+1)
X+2 .
– We proceed until we have determined k
(n+1)
X+T .
• We iterate on n until convergence, based on the distance between two consecutive
paths {k
(n)
t }
X+T
t=X−T and {k
(n+1)
t }
X+T
t=X−T .
4. We set T large enough for the distances |k
i(∞)
X−T − k
i∗| and |k
(∞)
X+T − k
∗| to fall below some
convergence threshold.
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B.6 Definitions
Investment in country i in period t is
I it ≡ K
i
t+1 − (1− δ)K
i
t = A
i
t+1L¯
i
t+1k
i
t+1 − (1− δ)A
i
tL¯
i
tk
i
t. (B-20)
Let W it−1 denote aggregate wealth in country i at the end of period t− 1:
W it−1 ≡
J−1∑
j=0
Lit−ja
i
j,t−j. (B-21)
The net foreign asset position of country i at the end of period t− 1 is defined as
NFAit−1 ≡ W
i
t−1 −K
i
t . (B-22)
Aggregate savings are defined as GNP minus aggregate consumption, i.e.,
Sit ≡ Y
i
t + (Rt − 1)NFA
i
t−1 − C
i
t , (B-23)
where Cit =
∑J
j=0 L
i
t−jc
i
j,t−j. One can easily show that:
Sit = ∆W
i
t + δKit.
Savings net of capital depreciation correspond to the change in country wealth ∆W it .
The current account position of country i in period t is
CAit ≡ NFA
i
t −NFA
i
t−1 = ∆NFA
i
t. (B-24)
From the definitions above, it follows that CAit = S
i
t−I
i
t . Finally, let S
i
j,t denote the individual
level of savings for an agent of age j in country i and period t, defined as
Sij,t ≡ NDI
i
j,t − c
i
j,t, (B-25)
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where the first term denotes the agent’s net disposable income
NDI ij,t ≡ (R
i
t − 1)a
i
j−1,t−1 + w
i
j,t + 1{j=J−∆}q
i
t. (B-26)
The saving rate for age j is computed as
sij,t ≡
Sij,t
NDI ij,t
= 1−
cij,t
NDI ij,t
. (B-27)
Savings by Age in the Three-Period Model. The general definitions (B-25)-(B-27) apply
in particular to the three-period version of the model without bequests. Using the notations
of Section 2, the level of saving of the young in country i and period t is
Siy,t = L
i
y,t(w
i
y,t − c
i
y,t) = L
i
y,ta
i
y,t+1 = −L
i
y,t
θi
Rt+1
wim,t+1,
where the last equality follows from Assumption 1. Normalizing by GDP, we get
Siy,t
Y it
= −(1 + giA,t+1)
1 + giL,t
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
θi
Rt+1
(1− α)
(
kt+1
kt
)α
.
The expression given in the text in Section 2.5 follows from the relationship that holds between
kt+1 and Rt+1 when δ = 1. The level of saving of the middle-aged in country i and period t is
Sim,t = L
i
m,t{w
i
m,t + (Rt − 1)a
i
y,t − c
i
m,t}
= Lim,t{(w
i
m,t +Rta
i
y,t − c
i
m,t)− a
i
y,t}
= Lim,t{a
i
m,t+1 − a
i
y,t}
= Lim,t
{
1
1 + β−σR1−σt+1
(1− θi) +
θi
Rt
}
wim,t.
Normalizing by GDP, we get
Sim,t
Y it
=
1
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
[
1− θi
1 + β−σR1−σt+1
+
θi
Rt
]
(1− α).
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Finally, the level of saving of the old in country i and period t is
Sio,t = rK,tK
i
t + (Rt − 1)[L
i
m,t−1a
i
m,t −K
i
t ]− L
i
o,tc
i
o,t
= (Rt − 1 + δ)K
i
t + (Rt − 1)L
i
o,ta
i
m,t − (Rt − 1)K
i
t − L
i
o,tRta
i
m,t
= −Lio,ta
i
m,t + δK
i
t
= −Lio,t
1
1 + β−σR1−σt
(1− θi)wim,t−1 + δK
i
t ,
where the last term is dropped when net savings are considered. Normalizing by GDP, we get
Sio,t
Y it
= −
1
1 + giA,t
1
1 + giL,t−1
1
1 + eit(1 + g
i
L,t)
1
1 + β−σR1−σt
(1− θi)(1− α)
(
kt−1
kt
)α
.
B.7 Calibration
Section 4.2 summarizes the calibration of the quantitative model. The vector of unobservable
parameters ψ ≡
[
σ, β, φ, θUS, θCH
]
is determined as follows. Let si0 and s
i
j,0 denote the model-
implied aggregate saving rate and the saving rate of agents of age j in country i in the
integration period, and let si,d0 and s
i,d
j,0 denote their counterparts in the data. We search over
a large grid Ψ the vector ψ∗ such that
ψ∗ = argmin
ψ∈Ψ
∑
i
∣∣∣si0(ψ)− si,d0 ∣∣∣+∑
i
J∑
j=0
ωij
(
sij,0(ψ)− s
i,d
j,0
)2
,
where ωij = e
i
j,0L
i
−j/L¯
i
0, so that the weights on different age groups in each country add up to
one and reflect their shares in the total effective population at the time of opening. We start
the search with a coarse grid covering a wide range to identify the region of the parameter
space where the solution lies and then refine the grid gradually. The final grid involves values
for 1/σ in [1.8 : 0.1 : 2.6], values for β (annualized) in [0.945 : 0.005 : 0.985], values for φ in
[0 : 0.01 : 0.06], values for θUS in [0.18 : 0.01 : 0.26], and values for θCH in [0, 0.01, 0.02].
59
C Data
C.1 Aggregate Data (for the figures shown in the Introduction)
List of Countries
Developed Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States;
Asian Countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong SAR, China, India, Indone-
sia, Kiribati, Korea, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
Data on Savings, Private Savings, Investment and Current Account (% of GDP).
Data for Emerging Asia and Developed Countries are from World Development Indicators
(World bank), Penn World Tables and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Private savings are
computed as the difference between Aggregate saving and Primary Government Surplus. Data
for Primary Government Surplus in Asian countries are only available starting 1988 for a large
sample of Asian countries.
Data on Household Saving Rates. Data for Developed Countries are from OECD (NIPA
personal saving rate for the U.S.). Data for India are from the Central Bank of India. Data
for China are from Song and Yang (2010) and authors’ calculations from Urban Household
Survey (UHS).
Cross-Section of Saving and Current Accounts (Figure 1.3). Data for the period
1998-2007 are from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Penn World Tables and
cover a sample of 89 countries. The list of countries is available on request.
C.2 Data for the U.S.
Definitions
Household disposable income: sum of individual income net of taxes (in USD).
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Household expenditure: household consumption expenditures (in USD).
Household saving: difference between household disposable income and consumption expen-
diture (in USD).
Household saving rate: Household saving divided by disposable income.
Consumer Expenditures Survey Data (CEX)
Annual data over the period 1986-2008 for consumption expenditures and income. Disag-
gregated by age groups (6 age groups): under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and above 65.
Disaggregated by sectors of expenditures. The sectors covered in the CEX data are: Food
and alcoholic beverages, Shelter Utilities and public services, Household expenses, Clothing
and apparel, Vehicles purchases, Gas and motor oil, Other vehicle expenses, Public trans-
portation, Health Entertainment, Education, Tobacco, Miscellaneous and cash contributions,
Life/personal insurance.
NIPA Data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Consumption and income data for 1986-2008. Consumption expenditures data are disaggre-
gated by sectors of expenditures. We match sectors in NIPA with the corresponding sectors
in CEX. Only two categories in NIPA consumption expenditures (accounting for about 1% of
total expenditures) do not appear in CEX data (Net foreign travel and expenditures abroad
by U.S. residents, and Final consumption expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving house-
holds). Aggregate consumption expenditures from CEX data do not match aggregate NIPA
data, as a result of underreporting of consumption in CEX—a bias which has increased over
time. Income displays a similar bias but without trend.
C.3 Data for China
Definitions
Household disposable income: sum of individual disposable income net of taxes within a house-
hold.
Household consumption expenditures: sum of consumption expenditures within household.
Household savings: difference between household disposable income and household consump-
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tion expenditure. Rates are computed by dividing by household disposable income.
Individual savings: difference between individual disposable income and individual consump-
tion expenditure (estimated). Rates are computed by dividing by individual disposable in-
come.
Urban Household Survey Data (UHS)
Annual data for the year 1986 and over the period 1992-2009 for consumption expenditures,
income and household characteristics (number of household members, age of household mem-
bers, employment status of household members...), for a large sample of urban households in
China. Starting from 1992, households are chosen randomly — based on several stratifications
at the provincial, city, country, township, and neighborhood levels — and are expected to stay
in the survey for 3 years. The 1986 survey covers 47,221 individuals in 12,185 households across
31 provinces. The 1992-2009 surveys cover 112 prefectures across 9 representative provinces
(Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu). The
sample size has been extended over time from roughly 5,500 households in the 1992-2001 sur-
veys to nearly 16,000 households in the 2002-2009 surveys. Disposable income is provided at
the individual for the years 1992-2009 (but not for 1986) and at the household level for all
years. Data for consumption expenditures are given at the household level. When estimat-
ing individual consumption expenditures and savings, we restrict our attention to individuals
above 25 and income earners aged between 19-24. Individuals under 25 without income and all
those below 18 are considered as children, whose consumption is imputed to other household
members (typically their parents).42
Chinese Households Income Project Data (CHIP)
CHIP survey data are available for the years 1995 and 2002. Income and consumption by age
for these two years are consistent across the UHS and CHIP datasets.
42In our final specification, old dependents (i.e., individuals above 65 earning zero income and living with
their offsprings) are treated in the same way as children, but the treatment of old dependents does not affect
our results.
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D Data Treatment
D.1 Correction Methods for the U.S.
The extent of underreporting of income and consumption in CEX, and their variations over
time, are depicted in Figure D.1. We describe two alternative methods to deal with underre-
porting in CEX . The first one makes adjustments using only aggregate data, while the second
one makes adjustments to consumption at the sector level. In the main text, we only refer to
the second method, which is in principle more accurate.
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Figure D.1: CEX Underreporting of Income and Consumption (CEX/NIPA ratios).
D.1.1 Method 1: Corrections Using Aggregate Data
Let cCEXj,t and y
CEX
j,t denote average consumption and income reported in CEX for age j in
year t, and let CDt and Y
D
t denote aggregate consumption and income in dataset D. We adjust
consumption and income for all ages according to
c˜j,t =
CNIPAt
CCEXt
cCEXj,t , y˜j,t =
Y NIPAt
Y CEXt
yCEXj,t .
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By construction, consumption expenditures and income match NIPA in the aggregate.43 The
corrected saving rate for age j in period t is s˜j,t = (y˜j,t − c˜j,t)/y˜j,t.
D.1.2 Method 2: Corrections Using Sectoral Expenditure Data
Since the degree of underreporting is likely to differ across types of goods, and since different
age groups potentially have different consumption baskets, we implement sector-specific ad-
justments. Let CDkt be the aggregate consumption expenditures of goods in sector k at date t
from dataset D. Define the following sector-specific weight:
χkt =
CNIPAkt
CCEXkt
. (B-28)
For all goods, the weights are greater than one due to underreporting in CEX, and they
increase over time as the bias gets larger. Consider consumption of good k by age-group j in
CEX, denoted by cCEXjkt . Our corrected measure of consumption expenditures in sector k for
group j is (up to the additional adjustment described below):
cˆjkt = χktc
CEX
jkt .
Total consumption expenditures of group j is then cˆjt =
∑
k cˆjkt. The corrected income net
of taxes yˆjt of group j is, as before: yˆjt =
Y NIPAt
Y CEXt
yCEXjt . Finally, the corrected saving rate of
group j is sˆjt = (yˆjt − cˆjt)/yˆjt.
The sector-specific factors need to be slightly modified to account for the fact that health
expenditures are treated differently in CEX vs. NIPA. Indeed health expenditures in CEX are
restricted to ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses, but NIPA also includes health contributions (Medicare
and Medicaid), leading to very large adjustment factor χhealth ≈ 5 — which primarily affects
our consumption estimates for the old, for whom ‘out-of-pocket’ health expenditures constitute
a large share of their consumption basket in CEX (≈ 12%). Without additional correction, we
43A small discrepancy remains since NIPA includes some expenditures (e.g., ‘Net foreign travel and ex-
penditures abroad by U.S. residents’ and ‘Final consumption expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving
households’) which cannot be matched with CEX categories.
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would tend to under-estimate the saving rate of the old. To address this concern, we amend
the computation of sectoral adjustment factors as follows. We set
χhealth,t =
∑
k 6=healthC
NIPA
kt∑
j 6=healthC
CEX
kt
,
and for other sectors z 6= health,
χz,t =
CNIPAzt
CCEXzt

1 + CNIPAhealth,t∑
k 6=health
CNIPAkt
−
CCEXhealth,t∑
k 6=health
CCEXkt

 .
Compared to the set of simple sector-specific weights given in (B-28), this amendment reduces
the adjustment factor for health to its average across other sectors while slightly increasing
the adjustment factor of other goods. Doing so, we still match NIPA aggregate consumption.
Age-saving profiles with or without adjustment for health expenditures are very similar, except
for the group of individuals above 65. We also find that Method 1 (using only aggregate data)
and Method 2 (using disaggregated expenditures data) produce results that are very similar.
D.2 Correction Methods for China
In the text, we argue that in the presence of multi-generational households, age-saving profiles
obtained from the ‘household approach’ are subject to an aggregation bias. Multigenerational
households are very prevalent in China (see Table 1). Figure D.2, which mimics Figure 4 in
Deaton and Paxson (2000), provides further evidence on Chinese household composition and
its evolution over time. For the years 1992 and 2009, the figure plots, as a function of the age
of individuals, the average age of the head in the households they live in. If everyone were a
household head or lived with persons of the same age (i.e., in the absence of multi-generational
households), the plot would be the 45-degree line. Instead, the plot lies above the 45-degree
line for young people (many of whom live with their parents), then more or less runs along the
line for those aged between 40-60, and then falls below the line for the elderly—many of whom
live with their children. Comparing across years, the figure suggests that young individuals
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are leaving their parents’ household on average later in 2009 than in 1992. Similarly, most
likely as a result of an increase in life expectancy, the elderly join their children’s households
at a later age in 2009 than in 1992. The fact that the degree of disconnect at various ages
changes over time suggests that the household approach could lead to biases when estimating
changes in saving rates across age groups.
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Figure D.2: Average Age of Household Head By Age of Individual.
To correct for the biases inherent to the household approach, we provide two alternative
‘individual’ methods — one based on the sub-sample of uni-generational households, and
another based on a projection technique proposed by Chesher (1997). In the main text, we
describe only the second method as we believe it is more accurate for the early years of our
sample, for which we have fewer observations. However we show below that the two methods
yield similar age-saving profiles (even more so towards the end of the sample period), which is
quite noteworthy as they rely on different sub-samples and different identification strategies.
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D.2.1 Individual Method 1: Re-Sampling of Uni-Generational Households
Our first approach to deal with the aggregation bias consists in restricting our attention to
the sub-sample of uni-generational households, which constitute more than 40% of the entire
sample.44 Individual consumption is inferred from household consumption by applying an
equal-sharing rule among members of the households.45 The main issue that arises with this
approach is that individuals of a certain age who live in a uni-generational household may
differ systematically, along a number of attributes, from individuals of the same age living in
multi-generational households. We find that individuals in uni-generational households indeed
differ from the whole sample in terms of income, gender, and marital status.46 In particular,
(i) individuals who live in uni-generational households tend to be richer than average, and (ii)
women tend to be over-represented among the young and under-represented among the old.47
To address potential selection biases, we re-weight the observations to match the distribution
of these attributes in the whole sample for each age, as described below. Given the limited
number of uni-generational household observations for the youngest and oldest age groups, it is
difficult to re-sample the data to match the distribution of all three attributes simultaneously
for these groups. Since income and gender appear to be the variables having the greater
impact on saving rates, we focus on these two variables to control for selection issues.48
Re-sampling of the restricted sample to match the income distribution
Young and old individuals who live alone tend to be richer than average. To address this issue,
44Any household with one adult or several adults belonging to the same generation (i.e., with a maximum
age difference less than 18 years), possibly with a child, is treated as uni-generational. Another benefit
of restricting the analysis to uni-generational households is to minimize concerns related to intrahousehold
transfers, which could potentially obscure actual saving behavior.
45Some aggregation bias remains if the equal-consumption rule does not apply to husband and wife, for
example, but it is reasonable to believe that consumption sharing is more equal within a generation than
across generations.
46We find no difference between the two samples along other characteristics (e.g., the number of children).
47In terms of marital status, young and old individuals who live in uni-generational households are more
likely to be married, the reason being that young people tend to move out of their parents’ household when
they get married, and the elderly are more likely to move back to their offsprings’ household when they lose
their spouse. The observed gender bias may come from the fact that young women marry and leave their
parents at an earlier age than men, and that widows are more likely to live with their children than widowers.
48Re-weighting observations to match the income distribution only, the income & gender distribution, or
the income & marital status distribution yields similar age-saving profiles. The only notable difference is that
estimated saving rates for the youngest individuals are lower when gender is not taken into account.
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observations are re-weighted so that the distribution of individual income for each age in the
restricted sample matches the aggregate income distribution. We first group individuals into
2-year age bins, and then assign weights to match the income decile distribution for each of
the 2-year bins. When the number of observations is insufficient (especially at the ends of
the age distribution), we use income quintiles. One potential problem with the approach is
that very high weights are assigned to individuals in the lowest income quantile for the young,
and that these young individuals may not be representative of the low-income youth who live
with their parents. Another potential concern comes from the fact that the elderly living
alone are more likely to receive monetary transfers from their children than those living in
their children’s household. Hence by focusing on uni-generational households, the income of
the old could be overestimated.49 Using CHIP survey data for the year 2002, for which more
detailed information on inter-household transfers is available, we find that this bias exists but
is small.
Re-sampling of the restricted sample to match the income & gender distribution
To correct for the gender bias among uni-generational households, we re-sample observations
to match the income distribution separately for men and women, and then combine the two
distributions with weights reflecting the gender composition in the whole sample.50
D.2.2 Individual Method 2: Projection Method (Chesher (1997))
In order to identify individual consumption from household consumption, we estimate the
following model on the cross-section of households for every year
Ch = exp(γ.Zh)
(
99∑
j=19
cjNh,j
)
+ ǫh,
where Ch is the aggregate consumption of household h, Nh,j is the number of members of
age j in household h, and Zh denotes a set of household-specific controls. Following Chesher
49The information available in UHS data does not allow us to identify the component of individual income
coming from inter-household transfers.
50We proceed in the same way when controlling for income & marital status.
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(1997), multiplicative separability is assumed to limit the number of degrees of freedom, and
control variables enter in an exponential term. The control variables include:
• Household composition: number of children aged 0-10, number of children 10-18, number
of adults, and depending on the specification, the number of old and young dependents.
The coefficient associated with the number of children is positive, as children-related
expenses are attributed to the parents.
• Household income group: households are grouped into income quintiles. The sign of
the control variable (a discrete variable 1-5) is positive: individuals living in richer
households consume more.
In the estimation, a roughness penalization term is introduced to guarantee smoothness of the
estimated function cj = c(j). This term is of the form:
P = κ2
∫
[c′′(j)]
2
dj,
where κ is a constant that controls the amount of smoothing (no smoothing when κ = 0 and
forced linearity as κ→∞). The discretized version of P , given that j is an integer in [19; 99],
can be written κ2(Jcj)
′(Jcj), where the matrix J is the 79× 81 band matrix
J =


1 −2 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 1 −2 1 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 1 −2 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . −2 1 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 −2 1


,
and cj = [cj]j=19,...,99 is an 81× 1 vector. Pre-multiplying cj by J produces a vector of second
differences. We set κ = 10.
69
As a robustness check, we use the projection method to estimate individual income distri-
butions by age from household income data, and then confront the estimated distributions to
the actual ones—which we observe for the period 1992-2009. The estimated income distribu-
tions are indeed very close to the observed ones.51
D.2.3 Estimated Profiles: Individual Methods vs. Household Approach
Figure D.3 shows the age-saving profiles estimated by the two individual methods for the
years 1992 and 2009. Although the two methods use different samples of households and
different identification strategies, they yield very similar age-saving profiles.52 The discrepancy
is larger at the beginning of the sample period. For the 1992 survey, there are only about
5,000 households in our sample (compared to about 16,000 after 2001), 44% of which are
uni-generational households. This makes it difficult to re-sample observations to match the
aggregate distributions of attributes as for some combinations of age and income level, there
are very few observations. The larger size of the sample in more recent years makes the
problem less severe and the profiles produced by the two methods become even more similar.
Figure D.4 displays the age-saving profiles obtained by applying the commonly used household
approach based on the age of the household head. As expected, this approach generates flatter
profiles (aggregation bias) and much higher saving rates for the youngest individuals (largely
driven by the selection bias).
D.2.4 Robustness Checks
Treatment of transfers. Intra-household transfers are not directly observable but we believe
they should affect our estimates to a lesser extent when we consider the sub-sample of uni-
generational households. Regarding inter-household transfers, the UHS data on individual
51For the year 1986, information on income is available only at the household level. For that year, we
therefore use the projection method to estimate both individual income and individual consumption. The
estimated age-saving profile for 1986 is then used to construct the average profile over the first three years of
observations (1986, 1992, and 1993).
52This suggests that our re-sampling procedure to control for income and gender characteristics in the first
method (using the sub-sample of uni-generational) takes care of selection issues quite well. The first method
does give slightly lower saving rates, indicating that some unobservable characteristics correlated with the
household composition are also correlated with saving behavior.
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Figure D.3: Estimated Age-Saving Profile for China in 1992 and 2009, Individual Methods.
Notes: The uni-generational method resamples the data to match gender and income distributions by age
group in the full sample. The youngest cohort are taken to be those < 26 under this method due to lack of
observation for individuals younger than 24 in the sample of uni-generational households. Chesher method
controls for household characteristics as described in Appendix C.3. UHS data (1992 and 2009).
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Figure D.4: Estimated Age-Saving Profile for China in 1992 and 2009, Household Method.
Notes: The saving rate for a given age is obtained as the average household saving rate for households whose
head is of that age. UHS data (1992 and 2009).
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income include information on received transfers (gifts from relatives, alimony, pensions and
grants), but without detailed information on the source of the transfer (e.g., other house-
holds or government). Our measure of individual income includes all received transfers. The
UHS survey also gives information on household transfer expenditures, i.e., transfer payments
to other households (gifts to relatives, alimony, family support), but only at the household
level. In the aggregate, we find that transfer expenditures are an order of magnitude larger
than (received) income transfers, possibly due to underreporting of the latter. Furthermore,
including transfer expenditures implies an estimate of the aggregate household saving rate
in China that is significantly lower than estimates typically reported in the literature. As a
result transfer expenditures are ignored in the estimated saving rates that we report. When
implementing individual methods 1 and 2 on a measure of expenditures obtained as the sum
of household consumption and transfer expenditures, we find age-saving profiles for the years
1992 and 2009 similar to those depicted in Figure D.3, but shifted downward by about 3%.
However, estimates of changes in saving rates across age groups over the sample period are
very similar whether transfers are included or not.
Other robustness checks. In non-reported robustness checks, we investigate alternative sets
of controls in the Chesher and uni-generational methods, and alternative treatments of zero-
income observations in the Chesher method. We also try dropping the top 1% and top
5% income earners from the sample. Estimated age-saving profiles are similar across all
procedures — with the exception of the saving rate of individuals under 25 in the early years
of the sample, for which our estimates vary between −5% and +5% depending on the method
and the controls. This is due to the small number of observations for this age group at the
beginning of the sample, especially when focussing on uni-generational households. Finally,
we use the two individual methods to estimate age-saving profiles with an alternative Chinese
survey (Chinese Household Income Project, CHIP) for the two years where these data are
available (1995 and 2002). Results are very similar both across methods and across surveys.
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